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NOTES
ATTEMPT TO ASsIGN INTEREST IN A SPENDTHRIFT TRusT*
TiE DANGER that cestuis of a spendthrift trust will take undue advantage
of the protection afforded them has led to a search for conceptual devices by
which, without rejecting this type of trust, the possibility of abuse may be
forestalled. A California court recently employed such a fiction to hold to
his bargain a husband who had attempted, as part of a property settlement,
to assign to his wife one half of an inalienable interest coming to him as
remainderman under a testamentary spendthrift trust. The income from the
trust had been paid to the husband's mother subject to a spendthrift clause,
and, upon her death, the corpus was to go in fee to the son,' protected by
the same spendthrift restraint, fully effective under the law of Pennsylvania,"
where the testator lived. When the life beneficiary died, the divorced wife
sought to reach half of the specific res in the hands of the trustee.0 Rebuffed
by the Philadelphia Orphans' Court where the instrument had been probated,
she later brought suit in California, asking for a personal judgment against
her husband, who had come into possession of the fund. After giving lip
service to the Pennsylvania decision, the court found the instrument, though
worded as a present assignment, was in effect a "contract to assign." Since
the defendant had breached the contract, the wife was held entitled to damages
equal to a half interest in the corpus.
4
Since this case arose because Pennsylvania surrounds the remainderman
under a spendthrift trust with the protection generally accorded only to a
beneficiary of the income, the particular problem presented would not often
be raised. But the decision is none the less significant in that the reasoning
*Kelly v. Kelly, 79 P. (2d) 1059 (Cal. 1938).
1. For the wording of the trust, see Kelly v. Kelly, 79 P. (2d) 1059, 1061 (Cal.
1938).
2. Beck's Estate, 133 Pa. 51, 19 Atl. 302 (1890), Goe's Estate, 146 Pa. 431, 23
Atl. 383 (1892) ; cf. /1 re Hall, 248 Pa. 218, 93 Atl. 944 (1915) ; Denniston v. Pierce,
260 Pa. 129, 103 At. 557 (1917).
3. There is an increasing willingness, both at common and statutory law, to allow
the cestui's dependent wife to levy on his interest for support. See Griswold, Rcachlint
The Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust (1929) 43 HARV. L. RLv. 63, 64;
Comment (1932) 21 CALI. L. REv. 142, 148. Alimony has also been given special
preference by some courts. See Burrage v. Bucknam, 16 N. E. (2d) 705, 707 (Mass.
1938) (listing authorities and arguments). But the property settlement, having its
roots in voluntary contract, is regarded in a far less favorable light than support and
alimony decrees, which are the result of judicial investigation. See Comment (1931)
19 CALIF. L. REv. 532.
4. Kelly v. Kelly, 79 P. (2d) 1059 (Cal. 1938) ; (1938) 23 MiNn. L. Rnv. 110.
5. No other state goes quite to the extreme that Pennsylvania does in allowing an
immediate right to receive the principal of a trust tobe subject to a valid restraint on
alienation. See note 2, supra. But at least two other states go almost as far in up-
holding restraints on alienation of principal held for the beneficiary until he attains a
certain age. Wallace v. Foxwell, 250 IIl. 616, 95 N. E. 985 (1911); Boston Safe Deposit
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would be equally applicable to attempted alienation of income, and of all the
jurisdictions which have passed on the question there are only four which
do not allow some form of spendthrift restraint upon the recipient of trust
income.6 It is the essence of the spendthrift trust doctrine that the ccslui
cannot assign away his rights to income,r whether the assignment arises
from an honest property settlement or from any other bona fide transaction.
Yet if the assignment is treated as a contract to pay in the future, an opposite
result is reached, apparently without sacrificing logic or defeating the funda-
mental purpose of the trust.
In related situations this concept is by no means a new one.8 The beneficiary
of an inalienable veteran's pension has been allowed to contract away his
interest.9 Similarly, a claim against the United States, non-assignable by
statute, may be made the subject matter of a partnership contract?10 Here,
as in the case of the spendthrift trust, any present assignment is specifically
forbidden, but courts are able to achieve the desired end by utilizing the
fiction of a contract to be performed in the future. Another analogy is apparent
in the cases where a conveyance of land which fails at law will be construed
as a contract to convey, enforceable in equity," a concept likewise recognized
in the law of sales12 and incorporated in the Uniform Sales Act.1 3 In situa-
tions of this sort, however, present conveyance is not forbidden, and the
construction is necessary only when an instrument has a fatal technical defect.
But a third and better analogy is found in an expectancy in a decedent's
estate, which is deemed too indefinite to have any status as a property interest
and therefore cannot be assigned. If a court feels the bargain to assign the
expectancy a fair one, it may be enforced by adopting the contractual deice24
The concept of a contract to assign has, however, apparently only once
before been urged in a court of last resort as applicable to spendthrift trusts.
and Trust Co. v. Collier, 222 M6ass. 390, 111 N. E. 163 (1916). For criticism of this
rule, see Scott, Control of Properly, by the Dead II (1917) 65 U. or PA. L RE%. 632,
645; (1916) 29 lH_-v. L. Rv. 557; cf. Kessner v. Phillips, 1S9 Mo. 515, 8S S.AV. C5
(1905).
6. See, generally, GniswoLD, SPE-DTHRrFT TRUsTs (1936). In eight states the
question of the spendthrift trust has not arisen. Of the remaining forty, twelve recognize
it at common law, tventy-two have adopted it by statute, twro are in confusion and only
four flatly repudiate it. The jurisdictional variations of the spendthrift doctrines are
subjected to critical analysis in a recent survey. N. Y. LAw REVIS~on Con.r., RZEco!x-
11ENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO THE RULE AGAINST PRnPErUITS AND SPrm-T, nIFT
TRUSTS (1938) 313-361.
7. See 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRaUsTES (1935) § 18.
. E.g., Shellabarger v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) 566 (C. C A. 7th, 1930); cf.
Kerr v. Crane, 212 Mass. 224, 98 N. E. 783 (1912).
9. Bostrom v. Bostrom, 60 N. D. 792, 236 N. NV. 732 (1931).
10. Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567 (1886); cf. Burcd= v. Taylor, 152 U. S. 634
(1894) (an attempted assignment of a non-assignable building contract with the state);
see also Portuguese-American Bank v. Welles, 242 U. S. 7, 12 (1916).
11. See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §464.
12. See 1 WLisTOx, SALEs (2d ed. 1924) § 137.
13. UN noRmu SALES Acr § 5(3).
14. See REsTATEMrNT, TRUSTS (1935) § 86(B) ; (1933) 21 CALrF. L REv. 394.
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There the contrary result was reached on the ground that the law will not
do indirectly what it cannot do directly.'r Such an objection arises chiefly
from the use of the term "contract to assign," which creates the miscon-
ception that the invalid assignment is actually being enforced. This confusion
can be avoided by changing the description to conform more closely to the
facts. What a court actually does in employing this device is to create and
enforce a "contract to pay over" the property when received.', There is no
"contract to assign" the right to receive the property, for, once a fund is in
the hands of the beneficiary, the right to receive it is extinguished and can
no longer, strictly speaking, be "assigned." The difference, to be sure, is
purely terminological, but the change in nomenclature reveals that the court
is merely allowing the cestui to do what he always had the power to do, that
is, to deal with the property as he sees fit once it is released from the trust.
The legendary justification of the spendthrift trust is found in the doctrine,
cujus est dare, ejus est disponere,17 but the degree to which courts will limit
or extend that maxim is essentially a matter of policy. There seems to be
no valid reason why it should be invoked to prevent the cestui from con-
tracting to pay over money which he shall have received at a later date. So
long as the res itself is kept inviolate in the hands of the trustee and the
status of the beneficiary's title remains unaltered, there is sufficient deference
to the dead hand. Clearly the cestui should not receive personal immunity
by virtue of the in rem restraint. To give effect to the assignment as a contract
to pay over is simply to place the assignee in the position of a contract creditor
on a par with any other creditors of the assignor, who can have judgment
against all assets over which the beneficiary has unrestrained control."8 No
creditor can touch the funds while they are still in the hands of the trustee,
nor can he attach the trustee's check before the debtor has converted it to
cash.19 The check will enable the beneficiary to buy the necessities which
15. BLxby v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 323 Mo. 1014, 22 S. W. (2d) 813 (1929).
But cf. Bursch v. Bursch, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 13, 1930, p. 2426, col. 3, where a municipal
court of New York City upheld the assignment of an interest in a spendthrift trust
by employing the contractual fiction. Apparently, no other court has ever adopted this
reasoning. Despite the lack of authority, however, the rule is advocated by the American
Law Institute. See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 152(K). It has also been urged
by scholars in the field. See GRIswoLD, SPENDTHRiFr TRUSTS (1936) § 372; Scott,
Necessitous Circumvention of Spendthrift Trusts (1932) 6 TEam,. L. Q. 503, 513.
16. In drafting an agreement of the nature of the property settlement in the principal
case, use of the term "contract to pay over" would seem the most likely means of assuring
a result similar to that reached in the principal case.
17. This theory of freedom of testate disposition was chosen by Mr. Justice Miller
as the basis of his famous decision which established the validity of the spendthrift
trust. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 (1875).
18. All courts are agreed that once the trust money comes into the beneficiary's
hands, it is subject to execution just as are his other assets. 1 BOGERT, Trus'rS AND
TRusTEEs (1935) §222.
19. There is a broad split of authority on whether a creditor can levy on a check
of which the debtor is payee. Those statutes and courts which allow him to do so base
their reasoning on the fact that a levy upon the check is a levy upon the debt represented
thereby. See Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 1003. However, since a spendthrift trustee
cannot be garnished, it follows his check cannot be attached.
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courts hold beyond a creditor's grasp ;20 the remaining proceeds can, like all
other assets, be reached by execution. 2 L If courts regard the assignment in
this manner, a settlor can be assured that his beneficiary will never be a
public charge, and yet the beneficiary will not be allowed to plead an unfair
defense2 2 to contracts entered into for fair value.
This concept of fair value, however, suggests one serious pitfall presented
by the contractual device: the danger that beneficiaries will be induced to
sign away all future interests for a grossly inadequate immediate return. If
an instrument were expressly drafted not as an assignment, but as a contract
to pay over funds after they had been received,m a peppercorn given by the
creditor would be enough to render the instrument enforceable at law. Despite
the manifest hardships that might thus be perpetrated upon improvident
cestuis, the law courts have refused to look behind the mere naked suffi-
ciency of consideration. But when, as in the principal case, the words used
are those of present assignment,2 4 there is an opportunity for a court to
exercise its equity powers, and thus assure the beneficiary of fair value. An
"assignment" of the spendthrift's interest is invalid upon its face, and if it
is to be given effect as a contract to pay over, the assignee should be forced
to seek his remedy in an equitable action for reformation and appropriate
relief.2 5 Traditionally the courts of chancery have been equipped to look
behind the mere legal sufficiency of consideration and insist on fair value.20
Today the equity courts have exclusive dominion over assignment of e-x-
20. See 1 SHINN, ATTACHMEXT AND G.wIsnmE.rr (1896) §64 et seq.; Ruod,
Attachment, Gandshment and Executions (1913) 10 Am. LAw AND Pno. 303, 405.
21. McIntosh v. Aubrey, 185 U. S. 122 (1902). For an argument that all proceeds
of an exempt check should also be exempted see (1938) 47 Ya L J. 1403.
22. The case for the spendthrift doctrine as a whole is seriously weakened by the
occasional flagrant abuses perpetrated by dishonest cestuis. E.g., Kilroy v. Wood,
42 Hun 636 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1886); Congress Hotel Co. v. Martin, 312 11. 318, 143
N. E. 838 (1924). The other strenuous argument advanced against the spendthrift
trust is that it tends to develop a parasite class at the top of the social order. See the
late Professor Gray's famous diatribe: GPxY, REsTRAINTS O. THE ALIMNATION O,
PRoPERTY (2d ed. 1895) Preface viii-x. but ef. Costigan, Those Protective Trusts
Which are Miscalled "Spendthrift Trusts" Reexamined (1934) 22 C,LT. L. REv. 471;
Manning, The Development of Restraints On Alienation Since Gray (1935) 48 -IAnV.
L. REv. 373.
23. See note 16, mspra.
24. In the principal case, the court remedied the breach by awarding damages, and,
in so doing, functioned as a court of law. Kelly v. Kelly, 79 P. (2d) 1059 (Cal. 1938).
However, no argument was raised that the wife had procured the assignment for inade-
quate consideration. The property settlement had been found to be a fair one in previous
litigation between the parties. Kelly v. Kelly, 1-9 Cal. App. 325, 18 P. (2d) 781 (1933).
25. It could be argued that this is not a proper ground for reformation, since the
change in the instrument might be said to make it conform not, as is usually the case,
to the intent of the parties, but to a legal theory which makes it enforceable. But this
is a fruitless argument, since the only purpose in changing the agreement to make it
meet legal requirements is to effectuate the aims of the parties.
26. See 3 PomEROY, EQurrY JURI PRtDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1270 et seq.
1939]
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pectancies in decedents' estates, and these are enforced when and if "adequate
consideration" is found.2 7 A like solution for the problem of attempted
assignments of a cestui's interest in a spendthrift trust would protect the
promisor against unconscionable bargains, while assuring the promisee of
a fair return for whatever he had lost.
COMITY IN THE ADINISTRATION OF TRUST ESTATES*
As part of a divorce settlement in an Ohio probate court, a husband for-
merly domiciled in that state established a trust fund for his children. The
trustee was a resident of Massachusetts, the beneficiaries were residents of
Ohio, and the funds consisted of an interest in a trust estate in Boston. Settlor
provided that the trust instrument was to be construed and administered
according to the laws of Massachusetts, but empowered the Ohio probate
court to direct payments out of principal when necessary for the benefit of
the children. Plaintiffs, Ohio attorneys, brought suit in the Ohio probate
court, seeking compensation out of the trust fund for their services to the
beneficiaries in setting up the trust. Settlor, his wife as guardian of the chil-
dren, and the trustee appeared specially to contest the court's jurisdiction.
On appeal, the trustee was permitted to withdraw his appearance, but the
common pleas court nevertheless affirmed a judgment for the plaintiffs. The
Miami County Court of Appeals, finding that the probate court had had juris-
diction of the subject-matter and the parties, and that the common pleas court
had had jurisdiction on appeal, affirmed the award. Plaintiffs then filed an
equitable bill in Massachusetts in an attempt to recover the amount of this
judgment from the trust fund. It was held that the trust res situated in
Massachusetts was subject to its jurisdiction alone; that the Ohio probate
court had no jurisdiction over the trustee; and that there was no personal
judgment against the beneficiaries, as the contingent interests of unborn re-
maindermen were not represented.' It was further stated that as the Ohio
probate court did not appear to rest its decision on a construction of the trust
deed, the instrument could be interpreted by the Massachusetts court, which
did not find that the deed gave the Ohio tribunal authority to order distribu-
tion of the trust funds for attorneys' fees.
The essential issue in the Massachusetts proceedings was whether "full
faith and credit" under the United States Constitution 2 must or should be
given a judgment of the Ohio courts to be paid out of personal property
physically situated in Massachusetts. In deciding such an issue, a primary
concern is the jurisdiction of the foreign court over the subject-matter of
the suit. The Ohio attorneys contended, with no apparent success, that a
27. See 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 953; Comment (1925)
25 COL. L. REv. 215.
*Harvey v. The Fiduciary Trust Co., 13 N.E. (2d) 299 (Mass. 1938).
1. Ibid.
2. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
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final judgment on jurisdiction over the subject-matter was res itdicala under
American Surety Company v. Baldwin,3 and recent United States Supreme
Court decisions 4 have since established that in certain situations at least
jurisdiction over the subject-matter once litigated is not subject to collateral
inquiry. But even if the jurisdictional findings of the Ohio courts were res
judicata, Massachusetts would not necessarily be obliged to accord those
findings "full faith and credit" under the Constitution. These recent holdings
presumably would not preclude a state from challenging the jurisdiction of
a sister court which had determined rights to property situated within the
former state.5
jurisdiction over the subject-matter in the administration of trusts is con-
sidered to be something more than the general authority over trusts conferred
on probate courts by statute. The "situs" of the trust is a decisive factor in
founding this jurisdiction.0 Having decided that "situs" is determined only
by physical location of the res and domicile of the trustee,7 the Massachusetts
court declared that since both these elements favored Massachusetts the
trustee could not be held to account in any other state. The court, citing
non-conflict cases,8 concluded that an Ohio probate court could not be given
3. 287 U. S. 156 (1932).
4. Davis v. Davis, 59 Sup. Ct. 3 (U. S. 1938); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 59 Sup. CL 134
(U. S. 1938); cf. Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, (1938) 59 Sup. Ct.
275 (U.S. 1939).
5. Anwrican Surety Co. v. Baldwin, supra note 3, held that questions of jurisdiction
were not to be re-litigated in a federal court after being once adjudicated in a state
court. The opportunity for an appeal in the state courts constituted due process, and
federal jurisdiction failed on collateral attack for want of a federal question. In Princess
Lida v. Thompson, supra note 4, the federal court lacked jurisdiction because a state
court had already assumed substantial control over the trust fund. Stoll v. Gottlicb,
supra note 4, decided that a federal court had the power to determine its own juris-
diction over the subject-matter and its paramount authority could not be collaterally
attacked in a state court. Cf. Des Moines Navigation & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co.,
123 U. S. 552 (1887). Davis v. Davis, supra note 4, invulved divorce proceedings and
not an adjudication of rights to property located in another state. Cf. Tuells v. Flint,
283 Mass. 106, 186 N.E. 222 (1932).
Since the federal question in each of these cases was a dispute between a state court
and a federal court, it is possible that the decisions have no bearing on constitutional
questions of full faith and credit between two state courts.
6. In some states trusts may be administered in either an in rem proceeding for
which the situs of the trust must be in the forum state or in an in pcrso:am proceed-
ing, the court having jurisdiction over the person of the trustee and general statutory
authority to adjudicate trust issues. Swetland v. Swetland, 105 N. J. Eq. 608, 149 Atl. 50
(Ch. 1930) ; aff'd uithout opinion, 107 N. J. Eq. 504, 153 Atl. 907 (1931).
7. This doctrine is well-established in Massachusetts, although none of the cases
cited for the proposition support it as stated here. Jenkins v. Lester, 131 Mass. 355
(1881) ; Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131 (1881); Codman v. Krell, 152 Mass. 214,
25 N. E. 90 (1890) ; Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 263, 116 N. E. 549 (1917) ; Greenough
v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (1920).
8. For example, United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435 (1936) (District Court
has no power to enjoin Secretary of Agriculture); Shaw v. Paine, 12 Allen 293 (Mass.
1896) (parties cannot confer probate powers on court with no probate jurisdiction);
1939] NOTES
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jurisdiction of the trust. More generally, however, factors other than the
physical location of the res and the domicile of the trustee are considered by
courts in determining the "situs" of a trust,9 and in this case Massachusetts
and Ohio seem to have been at least equally interested in the factors of trust
administration. The Massachusetts court admittedly had a substantial interest
in the disposition of the trust res. It was physically located in Massachusetts, 10
it was to be administered according to Massachusetts law, and the trustee
was domiciled in that state." Since the trustee had legal title to the property,
Massachusetts was the permanent situs for lawful taxation, and for tax pur-
poses the res could not and did not follow any person domiciled in Ohio.1 '
Massachusetts would probably have had jurisdiction of original litigation
unless its rights were deferred on grounds of comity to the intervening inter-
ests of a sister state. Yet Ohio was interested in the trust in that it was the
former domicile of the settlor 13 and the situs of the divorce and the divorce
settlement. 14 The Ohio probate court had jurisdiction of the wardship of
the cestuis'5 and was specifically granted by the trust instrument itself a
Harwood v. Tracy, 118 Mo. 631, 24 S. W. 214 (1893) (party cannot confer on legal
incompetent power to appoint a trustee).
9. To determine where a trust is to be administered, consideration is given to the
provisions of the instrument, the residence of the trustees, the residence of the bene-
ficiaries, the location of the property, and the place where the business of the trust is
to be carried on. RESTATEIENT, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS (1934) c. 297, comment d.
10. See Tuells v. Flint, 283 Mass. 106, 113, 186 N. E. 222, 225 (1932) (each state
has full jurisdiction over its inhabitants and the property within its boundaries) ; Keeney
v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 107, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728, 730 (1st Dep't 1902).
11. See Weissman v. Banque De Bruxelles, 254 N. Y. 488, 492, 173 N. E. 835, 836
(1930) ; City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Whiteing, 136 Misc. 416, 419, 241 N. Y. Supp,
398, 401 (Sup. Ct. 1930) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 294.5; STosr, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (Bigelow's 8th ed. 1883) § 388 at 550; Beale, Lizing Trusts of Movables (1932)
45 HARv. L. REv. 969, 972; Swabenland, The Conflict of Laws in Administration of
Express Trusts of Personol Property (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 438, 441.
12. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929); Lewis v. County
of Chester, 60 Pa. 325 (1869). But domicile of a decedent is the seat for taxation of
his intangibles. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
13. See Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, Inc.,
25 F. (2d) 493, 495 (D. Mass. 1928) ; Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Brewer,
27 Conn. 600, 605 (1858); Swetland v. Swetland, 105 N. J. Eq. 608, 613, 149 Atl. 50,
52 (Ch. 1930), aff'd without opinion, 107 N. J. Eq. 504, 153 Atl. 907 (1931); Cary v.
Carman, 116 Misc. 463, 470, 190 N. Y. Supp. 193, 197 (Sup. Ct. 1921) ; Lozier v. Lozier,
99 Ohio St. 254, 256, 124 N. E. 167 (1919) ; Dunham v. Crossland, 115 S. W. (2d) 742,
744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ; Creighton, Interstate and Itternational Living Trusts (1930)
50 TRUST COmPANIrEs 741.
14. Final payment of the divorce settlement is a final adjudication of rights, and
the probate court's jurisdiction generally ceases. Clough v. Long, 8 Ohio App. 420
(1918).
15. The guardian was appointed by the Probate Court of Miami County. Record
p. 119, Harvey v. The Fiduciary Trust Co., 13 N. E. (2d) 299 (Mass. 1938). See
OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) §§ 10501-53(4), 10507-2; Schmidt v. Schmidt,
280 Mass. 216, 218, 182 N. E. 374, 375 (1932).
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particular interest in its administration. 10 Moreover, the issues were first
litigated in Ohio,' 7 in a court which had authority to determine its own juris-
diction without setting forth on the record the facts and evidence upon which
judgment is rendered.' 8 Under these circumstances the issue, in fact, would
seem to be less a question of jurisdiction than of the propriety of a state's
administering a trust in which it has a substantial but divided interest.10 The
probate courts of both states had an interest which might be called jurisdic-
tion over the "situs" of the trust,20 physical situs of personal property 2 l and
domicile of inter vivos trustees2 not being essential to found jurisdiction, and
both had authority over fiduciaries.2 3 When a state with a substantial but
divided interest in the subject-matter of a suit assumes jurisdiction, sister
states are prone to enforce that judgment2 4 unless it is found to be in contra-
vention of the public policy of the forum." Thus the problem of "full faith
16. The trust instrument provided: "Said trustee and its successors shall mal:e
payments from principal of said trust fund . . . if and when such payments are author-
ized by order of the Probate Court of Miami County duly made and entered." The
court was to appoint successor trustees unless the beneficiaries had reached legal age,
and the trust was to continue as long after the beneficiaries' majority as the court deemed
necessary.
17. An interesting question is presented as to whether the forum of the action is a
factor to be considered by a court in its determination of what law governs. See Keeney
v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 108, 75 N.Y. Supp. 728, 731 (1st Dep't 1902); Lozier v.
Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 256, 124 N. E. 167 (1919).
18. The probate courts of Ohio are courts of record. OHIo GEN-. CODa Amr. (Page,
1937) § 10501-53 (13). See State ex rel. Young v. Morrow, 131 Ohio St. 265, 276,
2 N. E. (2d) 595, 599 (1936).
19. The RESTAT=aENT, CoNF.IcT OF LAWS (1934) § 299 does not talk in terms
of jurisdiction.
20. See 2 BEALE. op. cit. supra note 11, at §§n6.1, 297.1, 297.2; RESrA-,m-,r,
CoNFLicT oF LAWS (1934) § 297; Beale, Equitablc Interesls in Foreign Properly (1907)
20 HARv. L. Rnv. 382, 395; Beale, loc. cit. supra note 11; Comment (1919) 19 CoL L.
REv. 486, 488. "One might well assume from reading the rules formulated by Beale
and the American Law Institute for inter vieos trusts that a mere numerical preponder-
ance of the factors in one state would cause the law of that state to govern." Swabenland,
loc. cit. supra note 11.
21. See Henderson v. Usher, 118 Fla. 688, 691, 160 So. 9, 10 (1935); Lozier v.
Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 256, 124 N. E. 167 (1919).
22. See Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen 101, 104 (Mass. 1861); Reynolds v. Reynolds,
208 N. C. 578, 627, 182 S. E. 341, 371 (1935).
23. Onio GN-. CoDE ANN. (Page, 1937) § 10501-53(13), Unger v. Wolfe, 134
Ohio St. 69, 15 N. E. (2d) 955 (1938) ; MAss. Am. LAWS (1933) c. 215, §§ 6, 8, 39,
see James v. James, 260 Mass. 19, 22, 156 N. E. 745, 747 (1927) ; Ginzberg v. Vyan,
272 Mass. 499, 500, 172 N. E. 614, 615 (1930).
24. See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S. 346, 354 (1913); Rachemann v.
Taylor, 204 Mass. 394, 402, 90 N. E. 552, 556 (1910); Harrison v. Commissioners of
Corporations and Taxation, 272 Mass. 422, 427, 430, 172 N. E. 605, 603, 609 (1930);
Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 N. J. Eq. 186, 189, 41 Ad. 252, 253 (Ch. 1S93) ; cf. Tuells v.
Flint, 283 Mass. 106, 113, 186 N. E. 222, 225 (1932); Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div.
104, 108, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728, 731 (1st Dep't 1902); see STony, Co:mFLcr oF Lws
(Bigelow's 8th ed. 1883) § 514(b) n at 732.
25. See Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N. Y. 30, 39, 35 N. E. 407, 409 (1893) ; Dougherty
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 102, 193 N. E. 897, 903 (1934); City
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and credit" in the instant situation might well have been resolved in terms
of comity rather than of jurisdiction. Such a distinction is not merely academic
delineation, for if each state can found sole jurisdiction on the basis of its
divided interest, litigation in trust suits would be a ceaseless activity,"' Use
of comity concepts would pragmatically result in much less conflict, for the
limiting factors of "public morals" and "public policy" have at present little
content.
27
Massachusetts perhaps refused recognition for the unstated reason that
it considered an award of one-quarter of a trust fund to the attorneys who
assisted in establishing it unconscionable and contrary to its public policy.
But this specific problem was before the Ohio Court of Appeals ;28 the ques-
tion was adjudicated there; and, after a review of the legal services performed,
an order was affirmed on the authority of Ohio 29 and United States Supreme
Court8" decisions. Ohio and the federal courts, contrary to the rule prevailing
in Massachusetts and some other states,31 permit attorneys who were not
retained by the trustee or receiver 32 to recover out of trust or receivership
funds, or proportionately from those benefited by the litigation. While un-
conscionable judgments may well be valid grounds for refusing "full faith
and credit" in conflict cases, it would seem that in this instance the courts
of Ohio had adjudicated the propriety of the counsel fees and that comity
dictated recognition and full faith.
The Massachusetts court also inquired into the jurisdiction of Ohio over
the person of the trustee and the contingent interests of unborn remainder-
men, although under conventional conflicts rules 33 a final judgment upon
Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Cheek, N. Y. L. J., June 7, 1935, p. 2941; RESTATEmrNT,
CoNFLIcr OF LAws (1934) § 612.
26. See Rackemann v. Taylor, 204 Mass. 394, 398-401, 90 N. E. 552, 554-55 (1910).
27. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 236 (1908); McKnett v. St. Louis &
S. F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934); Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N.Y. 30, 41, 35 N. E.
407, 410 (1893); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICt OF LAWS (1934) § 612 at 732; 2 BLALr,
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 445.1, 446.1.
28. Sampson v. Mattern, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 693 (1935).
29. Trumpler v. Royer, 95 Ohio St. 194, 115 N. E. 1018 (1917); Koelble v. Runyan,
25 Ohio App. 426, 158 N. E. 279 (1927) ; Estate of Oskamp, 1 Ohio N. P. (N.s.) 197
(Prob. Ct. 1902) ; see 2 RE.STATEmENT OF TRUSTS (1935) §§ 269, 270.
30. Trustees of Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1881); Central Railroad & Banking Co.
v. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116 (1885) ; Harrison v. Perea, 168 U. S. 311 (1897).
31. MAsS. ANN. LAWS (1933) c. 215, §§ 39, 45; Mulloney v. Barnes, 266 Mass.
50, 164 N. E. 917 (1929); Conley v. Fenelon, 266 Mass. 340, 165 N. E. 382 (1929);
N. Y. SuRR. CT. ACT § 231a, Matter of Chaves, 143 Misc. 872, 257 N. Y. Supp. 645
(Surr. Ct. 1932) (primary and exclusive intention of statute was to fix payments
rendered to representatives rather than for services rendered individual beneficiaries).
32. A guardian has the right to employ counsel or incur other expenses in the
interest of a ward's estate, and in some jurisdictions such services are a proper credit
against the estate. Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U. S. 42 (1883) ; Kingsbury v. Powers, 131
Ill. 182, 22 N. E. 479 (1889) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Flowers v. Flowers, 326 Pa. 138,
191 At. 914 (1937); see Harris' Appeal, 323 Pa. 124, 131, 186 Atl. 92, 96 (1936);
cf. Payne v. Rech, 6 Ohio App. 327 (1917).
33. RESTATEmENT, CONFLIcT OF LAWS (1934) § 451.
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jurisdiction over the person3 4 is res judicata.3, The inquiry as to the
trustee turned on a withdrawal of his special appearance30 after an appeal
to the common pleas court. The privilege of a defendant to withdraw after
a court has adversely adjudicated jurisdiction over his person is in dispute;
but many courts, including those of Massachusetts, have held that a plaintiff's
rights may not be prejudiced by such withdrawal, and that a judgment in
his favor may none-the-less be entered.37 Furthermore, the Ohio Court of
Appeals specifically found that the common pleas court had had jurisdiction
on appeal.38 It appears that the trustee, on a voluntary appearance, had had
his jurisdictional rights determinatively adjudicated and was bound by the
decision.39 Mlassachusetts also asserted that no personal judgment could run
against the beneficiaries since in the Ohio proceedings no guardian ad liten
was appointed to represent the contingent interests of unborn remaindermen.
But there is a conflict of authority whether even cestuis are necessary parties
to a suit against a trustee when their interests are not adverse to those of the
trustee,40 and it is less reasonable to hold that remote contingent interests
34. Support can be marshalled for the argument that personal property follows the
person so that if the court has jurisdiction over the parties, it has jurisdiction over the
subject-matter and can enforce a trust or any other equity. See 1 PEn y, Tnus's (7th
ed. 1929) § 70 at 54.
35. See Stone Leather Co. v. Henry Boston & Sons, 234 Mass. 477, 478, 126 N.E.
46 (1920); Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co., 316 Mo. 812, 826, 293 S. 1V. 760, 76 (1927);
Waters v. Spencer, 44 Misc. 15, 18, 89 N. Y. Supp. 693, 695 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
36. It is not clear whether there was a withdrawal of appearance at all, but if there
was it was withdrawn on application of counsel for the guardian and minors and not by
the Fiduciary Trust Co. See Record, p. 99, Harvey v. The Fiduciary Trust Co., 13
N. E. (2d) 299 (Mass. 1938). The Massachusetts Court, however, did not consider the
point.
37. United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106 (U. S. 1I.M); Garber v. Greenberg, 225
fass. 422, 114 N. E. 670 (1917) ; Cooley v. Lawrence, 12 How. Pr. 176, 184, 12 -N. Y.
Super. Ct. (5 Duer) 605, 610 (1855) ; White v. Thompson, 3 Ore. 115 (185,9) ; Ball v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. App. 102 (1926) ; Phillips v. The Maccabees, 50 S. W\.
(2d) 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); United States F. & G. Co. v. Nash, 20 Wyo. 65,
124 Pac. 269 (1912), denying rchcaring of 121 Pac. 541 (1912); cf. Rio Grande Irriga-
tion & Colonization Co. v. Gildersleeve, 174 U. S. 603 (1899) (party may not %%ithdrawr
without leave of court) ; First National Bank of Danville v. Cunningham, 43 Fed. 510
(C. C. D. Ky. 1891) (may withdraw before adverse action on motion to vacate) ; White-
head v. Post, 2 Ohio Dec. (Reprints) 468 (1861) (appearance "improvidently entered"
may be withdrawn on leave of court); see Graham v. Spencer, 14 Fed. 693, 603 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1882) ("it is plain no question of personal jurisdiction was intended to be sub-
mitted.").
38. See note 28, supra.
39. In Ohio a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter
operates as a general entry of appearance. See Klein v. Lust, 110 Ohio St 197, 205,
143 N. E. 527, 529 (1924) ; State ex rel Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ohio App.
269, 270, 198 N. E. 56, 57 (1935) ; Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25,
29 (1917).
40. Compare Talbutt v. Security Trust Co., 22 F. Supp. 241 (E. D. Ky. 1938);
Braley v. Spragins, 221 Ala. 150, 128 So. 149 (1930); Lee v. Silva, 197 Cal. 364, 240
Pac. 1015 (1925); Madden v. Madden, 279 Mass. 417, 181 N. E. 771 (1932); Hood v.
Cannon, 178 S. C. 94, 182 S. E. 306 (1935) with Vetterlein v. Barnes, 124 U. S. 169
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must be represented. 41 Massachusetts, for example, has not been so rigid
in its requirements heretofore, but has considered the problem to be one of
judicial discretion. 42
Eliminating, for purposes of discussion, all questions of jurisdiction, a
trust instrument providing for administration by the courts of two states
raises interesting questions of comity. On the few occasions in which two
states have been designated,43 the settlor's intentions have apparently con-
trolled,44 and although the courts of one state may be reluctant to administer
a trust in common with the courts of a sister state,45 administration by two
states has at times been necessary. To illustrate, a will probated in the domicile
state may provide for the administration of a charitable trust in another juris-
diction. The domicile state will then construe the will according to its laws,
collect the assets, and pay them over to the sister state for administration
under the foreign law.4 6 A trust consisting of real property situated in two
(1888); Noel v. Noel, 195 Atl. 315 (Md. 1937); Sweet v. Parker, 22 N. J. Eq. 453 (Ch.
1871) ; Colorado & Southern Ry. v. Blair, 214 N. Y. 497, 108 N. E. 840 (1915) ; Jack-
son v. Talmadge, 246 N. Y. 133, 158 N. E. 48 (1927). See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMRtINTq (5th
ed. 1925) § 500 at 1074.
41. See Talbutt v. Security Trust Co., 22 F. Supp. 241 (E. D. Ky. 1938) ; Shirk v.
Walker, 10 N. E. (2d) 192, 199 (Mass. 1937).
42. See Wickwire Spencer Steel Corp. v. United Spring Mfg. Co,, 247 Mass. 565,
569, 142 N. E. 758, 759 (1924).
43. In the more typical situation, the settlor expresses no intent as to what state law
and procedure he desires to govern the administration of the trust. Courts have then
directed their efforts toward ascertaining that intent with a view to making it effective.
See Gillette v. Stewart, 108 Conn. 611, 617, 144 Atl. 461, 463 (1929); Russell v. Joys,
227 Mass. 263, 267, 116 N. E. 549, 550 (1917); It re Vanneck's Will, 158 Misc. 704,
706, 286 N. Y. Supp. 489, 491 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; Lanius v. Fletcher, 100 Tex. 550, 553, 101
S. W. 1076, 1077 (1907) ; In re Risher's Will, 277 N. W. 160, 162 (Wis. 1938).
Where intentions have been expressed, courts have been diligent in carrying them out,
provided the settlor's wishes do not contravene the state's public policy. See Liberty
National Bank v. New England Investors' Shares, Inc., 25 F. (2d) 493, 495 (D. Mass.
1928) ; In re Estate of Beckwith v. Cooper, 258 Ill. App. 411, 417 (1930) ; Shannon v.
Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 102, 9 N. E. (2d) 792, 794 (1937); it re McAuliff's
Estate, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 605, 607 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; In re Chappell's Estate, 124 Wash.
128, 132, 213 Pac. 684, 685 (1923); R.xSTA'rEMFNT, CoNrmcr OF LAWS (1934) § 297;
Beale, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws (1930) 44 HARV. L. REv. 161, 163;
Comment (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 100, 107; (1938) 6 DUKE B. A. J. 37.
44. Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (1937),
45. See Jenkins v. Lester, 131 Mass. 355, 357 (1881) ; Harrison v. Comm. of Cor-
porations and Taxation, 272 Mass. 422, 427, 428, 172 N. E. 605, 608, 609 (1930);
Schwarts v. Gerhardt, 44 Ore. 425, 427, 75 Pac. 698, 699 (1904); RESTATR mSNI, Cox-
FLIC OF LAWS (1934) § 299; 2 BEALE, CoNFLIcr OF LAWs (1935) §299.1. But see
Henderson v. Usher, 118 Fla. 688, 694, 160 So. 9, 11 (1935); Rosenbaum v. Garrett,
57 N. J. Eq. 186, 188, 41 Atl. 252, 253 (1898) ; Davis v. Davis, 57 N. J. Eq. 252, 255,
41 Atl. 353, 354-55 (Ch. 1898); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Ferris, 67 App. Div. 1,
5, 73 N. Y. Supp. 475, 477-78 (1st Dep't 1901); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed.
1932) 968-971; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Bigelow's 8th ed. 1883) § 514 (b) n.
46. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424 (1871) ; Hollis v. Drew Theological
Seminary, 95 N. Y. 165 (1884) ; Hope v. Brewer, 136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 558 (1892) ;
Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N. Y. 30, 35 N. E. 407 (1893) ; see DicEY, CoNFLICT Or LAWS
states will likewise be administered under the laws of each.4- There is appar-
ently neither law nor judicial pronouncement which forbids bilateral admin-
istration,4 8 and it is difficult to see wherein any concept of public policy is
contravened by it. On the contrary, it would seem, as in the instant case, that
comity would militate strongly in favor of recognition of sister state judgments
in the administration of specific phases of a trust estate.
PROBLEMS OF ANTI-TRUST PROSECUTION: THE ALCOA SUIT*
IN THE popular mind, "monopoly" is best exemplified by the Aluminum
Company of America. The notoriously complete control which this company
enjoys over the production of virgin aluminum1 in America would seem at
a glance to place it indisputably within the proscription of any monopoly or
attempt to monopolize in Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2 Nevertheless, the
obvious inference that the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice
has selected an easy victim in attacking the Company under this Act is
dissipated by a more penetrating scrutiny. The path of prosecution is lined
with successive pitfalls, some created by facts peculiar to the present suit,
others left by the courts in deciding past anti-trust cases.
The first problem encountered surrounded the framing of the petition. Pre-
cedent indicates that the successful formula includes allegations as to preda-
tory practices,4 manipulation of prices5 and growth by abnormal means. 6
(5th ed. 1932) 205; Beale, Equilable Interests in Foreign Property (1907) 20 HAn'. L
REv. 382, 395.
47. Ricketson v. Merrill, 148 Mass. 76, 19 N. E. 11 (188); Beardsley v. Hall, 291
Mlass. 411, 197 N. E. 35 (1935) ; see REsT.TEmENT, Co,;Fucr OF Lws (1934) § 243.
48. See Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 102, 9 N. E. (2d) 792, 794
(1937); STORY, CoNFIcr oF LAWS (Bigelow's Sth ed. 1883) § 514 (b) n.
* United States v. Aluminum Company of America, Equity No. 85-73 (S. D. N. Y.
petition filed April 23, 1937).
1. See WALLACE, MAR=ET CoNToRL IN TnE Axum1 r I."D, L sTRY (1937); Luiun,
CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL IN AmTRmcAN INDUSTRY (1931) 74, 293-293; Wechsler,
United States v. Alcoa (1933) 147 NATION 346.
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 2 (1934).
3. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, Equity No. 85-73 (S. D. N. Y.
petition filed April 23, 1937); see N. Y. Times, April 24, 1937, p. 1, col. 1.
4. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); United States v. Pat-
terson, 201 Fed. 697 (S. D. Ohio 1912); see United States v. Swift & Co., 256 U. S. 105,
118 (1932); cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920). See
Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust La=s (1932) 32 Cot- L. REV. 179, 245
et seq.
5. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); American Biscuit Co.
v. Klotz, 44 Fed. 721 (E. D. La. 1891); see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S.
106, 116 (1932).
6. United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214 (1922); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911); see Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U. S. 1, 75 (1911).
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Although these charges are made,7 the Government regards them as but pre-
cautionary formalities." Their proof has been rendered virtually impossible
by the reported dramatic disappearance of Senator Walsh's comprehensive
anti-Alcoa library9 shortly before suit was instituted and by the fact that
the Company's most flagrant misconduct occurred during the years preceding
the past decade.' 0 Suspecting that the court may find the stain of past mis-
deeds eradicated by present apparently good behavior,"1 the Department of
Justice is relying chiefly on the argument that, regardless of how achieved, a
complete monopoly in a field which would ordinarily be competitive violates
the Sherman Act.' 2 The existence of such a monopoly is sought to be estab-
lished under allegations that the Aluminum Company produces 100% of the
virgin aluminum manufactured in the United States; that it has achieved
this position through control of over 90% of the American bauxite deposits
and most of the available waterpower sites; and that its control extends to
50-60% of manufactured aluminum goods.' 3 But despite these highly favor-
able facts, other impediments appear which may prevent the vital question
of 100% monopoly from squarely confronting the court. By emphasizing
the competition afforded by the production of secondary aluminum, the im-
portation of virgin aluminum and the substitution of other metals, the court
can deliberately evade the issue, albeit on tenuous grounds.' 4 Or, even should
the Government succeed in establishing the existence of monopoly, it may
find that it cannot overcome the judicial disfavor engendered by the delay
7. Petition of the Government, p. 42 et seq., United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, Equity No. 85-73 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
8. Brief for United States on Meaning of Sherman Act (filed Sept. 21, 1938) p. 8,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, Equity No. 85-73 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
9. See Wechsler, supra note 1.
10. See Comment (1937) 37 CoL L. REv. 269; Wechsler, supra note 1. Whatever
suspicion the Corporation's unusually stable prices may have occasioned since then, no
fault was found when its tactics were subjected to judicial scrutiny in 1935. Baush Ma-
chine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). Any
support to be derived from that suit rests in the somewhat equivocal inference to be
drawn from Alcoa's settlement with the Baush Co. despite a favorable decision. See
N. Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1935, § III, p. 10, col. 1.
11. Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920); Uniltcd
States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693 (1927); United States v. American
Can Co., 230 Fed. 859 (D. Md. 1916).
12. See Brief for United States, supra note 8, at p. 8.
13. Petition of the Government, supra note 7, p. 17 et seq., see 3 FEDERAL TRADE
CommissioN, REPORT ON HOUSE FURNISHNGS INDUSTRIES (1925) 64; LAMLr, 10C. cit.
supra note 1.
14. Recognition of the facts renders this position untenable. Aluminum imports to
others than Alcoa during 1924 to 1933 were only from four to nine per cent of the total
annual supplies. See N. R. A. REPORT, ALUmINUm INDUSTRY (1934) 19. There are Im-
portant differences, furthermore, between primary and secondary aluminum with respect
to weight, purity, brittleness, tensile strength, etc., which substantially impair use of
secondary aluminum as a substitute. Because of its lightness, aluminum is replaceable
only rarely by other metals. See ANDERSONT, THE METALLURGY or ALUMINUM AND
ALUmINUm ALLOYS (1925) 475. For the importance of the distinction between virgin




in bringing suit. In the past courts have viewed disapprovingly the contrast
between the ordinarily lengthy period during which a merger would flourish
unattacked and the promptness exhibited in prosecuting a loose combina-
tion.15 The present suit is the second governmental attempt to police the
aluminum industry, the first having resulted in a consent decree in 1912.10
By suffering the Aluminum Company to expand unmolested since that time,
the Department has invited the difficulty of explaining the twenty-five year
interval between prosecutions in an industry which has undergone no sub-
stantial changes in the interim. 17
Even if all these barriers are crossed successfully, the Government cannot
but approach the framing of its legal argument with misgivings. Although
loose combinations have often been dissolved,' 8 the courts have sanctioned
wide freedom for so-called "naturally growing" corporations." Thus the
Department is faced with the necessity of overcoming the judicial discrim-
ination in favor of growth by merger,20 a task for which the existing case
law on the subject pro-ides little help. Anti-trust cases do not exemplify
the cumulative development of a law through progressive judicial interpreta-
tion; the widely divergent decisions at best present to a court a body of ex-
15. In five cases involving growth by fusion the time from the inception of the
combination to the bringing of suit has been from ten to thirteen years. In six cases
of loose combination, the time was between one and two years, except in tv-o cases, of
six and eight years, respectively. See Hardy, Loose and Consolidated Combinations
under the Anti Trust Laws (1933) 21 GEo. L. J. 123.
16. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (W. D. Pa. 1912), DEcMES & JUL,6-
MENTS IN FEDERAL ANTITRUST CASES (1918) 341. This decree, which was limited to the
proscription of certain contracts, was resurrected by the Aluminum Company to provide
the basis for an injunction against the present proceedings under the doctrine of res
judicata. Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 374 (NW. D. Pa. 1937).
The injunction was dissolved by a special expediting court formed under § 1 of the Ex-
pediting Act, 36 STAT. 854, 1157 (1910), 15 U. S. C. §28 (1934). United States v. Alum-
inum Co. of America, 20 F. Supp. 608 (W. D. Pa. 1937), aff'd, 302 U. S. 230 (1937); see
Comment (1938) 38 CoL L. Rav. 515. Although it might have been contended that the
Government had an adequate remedy in supplementary proceedings under the old decree,
this argument would probably not be sustained in view of the implicit recognition by the
court that the problems provoking the present suit differed too greatly from those in
the earlier litigation to fall within the ambit of such supplementary proceedings. The
significance of the question lies in its effect on the Government's choice of forum.
17. By 1912 the last of the basic patents protecting the monopoly had expired and
Alcoa remained in possession of the industry purely by virtue of its size and control of
bauxite. Competing invaders were regularly bought or squeezed out and the history of
the industry was essentially that of a single organization's continued grovth. See note 1,
supra.
18. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 6 0
(1914); American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); see Hardy, sapra
note 15.
19. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920); cf. United
States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214 (1922); United States v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 226 Fed. 62 (W. D. N. Y. 1915); see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, M21 U. S.
1, 75 (1911); Handler, loc. cit. supra note 4.
20. See Hardy, mspra note 15.
1939]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
perience gathered in applying a statute to varying factual situations.' An
attempt, therefore, to marshal precedent into an argument that will impel
the court inexorably to one conclusion in a particular case may ultimately
result in unwitting demonstration that the existing law permits a decision
either way on a given set of facts. Flatly contradictory dicta are available.
Thus, the same court which has said, "The law does not make mere size . . .
or the existence of unexerted power an offense, ' 22 said in the same year,
"That such a power . . . regardless of the use made of it, constitutes a
menace to and an undue restraint upon interstate commerce within the mean-
ing of the Anti-Trust Act, has been frequently held by this court."-a To
attempt to reconcile such broad statements as these by the purely mechanical
process of distinguishing their factual bases seems wholly futile in view of
their universal applicability. The Department of Justice is left, then, with
two hardly desirable alternatives: if it attempts to draw favorable general-
izations from the entire body of anti-trust law, it is met with a confusing
welter of antithetical dicta from which unfavorable generalizations are
equally available; if, on the other hand, it narrows its argument to a process
of distinguishing and matching factual situations, it merely draws to the
attention of the courts their power to distinguish the instant case in like
manner from favorable precedents.
It becomes apparent, then, that the Government must rely less on a legal-
istic approach than on an economic argument. This is in itself no disad-
vantage, for, although anti-trust opinions have been couched in legal doc-
trines, sporadic dicta reveal that behind this phraseology lies recognition that
the problem is essentially economic.24 In adopting this approach, however,
the Supreme Court has constantly identified large corporations with economy
of production. 25 Accordingly, the achievement of vertical integration or the
organization of a unit whose size would enable it to enter foreign trade have
been deemed desirable enough to justify incidental suffocation of competi-
tion.2 ( Nor has the judicial eye seen any other public interest which would
require withholding the rewards of industrial efficiency by curtailing normal
growth.2 7  Before the Anti-Trust Division can prevail, therefore, it must
persuade the courts to modify these beliefs in the light of more recent eco-
nomic views. The theory that increase in size is always paralleled by increase
21. See Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. United States, 263 U. S. 563, 579
(1925) ; Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 600 (1936).
22. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 451 (1920).
23. See United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 57 (1920).
24. See Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 583
(1925) ; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 438 (1920) ; United
States v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 224 U. S. 383, 410 (1912). For a frank
treatment of antitrust problems on an economic basis, see Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United
States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
25. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 438 (1920);
United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202, 217 (1913).
26. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 442, 445 (1020);
United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202, 218 (1913).
27. But this view seems to be confined to cases arising under the Sherman Act. Cl.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933), where, although taxation tending to drive out
chain stores was approved only in part, the majority and especially the two minority
opinions show a lively awareness of the social harm that might accompany the economic
efficiency of the chains.
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in efficiency has been qualified by the view that there is an optimum unit for
each industry beyond which efficiency gives way to unwieldiness. -s Nor can
vertical integration, though often augmenting efficiency, be designated cate-
gorically as a commendable objective. Its economies may not be available to
an industry whose stages of production are as simple as, for example, those
of the Aluminum Company.20 The benefits of giantism, moreover, become
obscured by the burdensome capital structure which is necessitated by mo-
nopolistic control of resources not fully exploited20 Such circunstances give
rise to the presumption that a monopoly must take advantage of its position
in order to earn a "reasonable profit on an unreasonable capitalization."3 1
Even though the Supreme Court, as at present constituted, might perhaps be
receptive to these arguments,32 the high bench as well as the district judge
will be the less likely to favor the Government because of the even more
vexing problem of providing a practicable remedy. Before the courts will
plunge into the complexity of dissolution, they must have some assurance
that a plan can be devised which will offset the consequences which they
envision as attending the disruption of delicately coordinated industrial ma-
chinery.3 3 In the Standard Oil case, 34 for example, the Supreme Court did
28. See ELY, OUTLINES OF ECOWOAICS (5th ed. 1932) 548; SLicnIIT, 'MoDo-: Eco-
xomic Soczvv (1931) 134. For some indication that Alcoa has exceeded the optimum
point in its development, see XVALLAcE, MARKET CONTROL IN TuE ALWT1NUrn INDUSTnv
(1937) Ch. IX.
29. Whether or not vertical integration is economical to the corporation attempting
it, it is often productive of evil effects on the rest of the industry. MWhere outsiders are
dependent on the parent corporation for necessary raw materials, it is impossible to pre-
vent discrimination in favor of a competing subsidiary, for costs are easily concealed in
the maze of accounting systems. Typical of this situation is the relationship enjoyed
between the Aluminum Goods Co., which manufactures kitchenwvare, and the Alcoa
reducing plants, which produce sheet aluminum. See HoANLEn, Tun FE--LL ANTI-
TRUST LAWS-oLUMBIA SYvosIuM (1932) 150 et seq.; Vechsler, stpra note 1.
30. See HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 29, at 148. Alcoa, for example, is said to
control many unused wvaterpower sites by leases which necessitate annual payments;
these sites, appearing in its balance sheet as assets, provide the basis for a correspond-
ing expansion of the capital structure. See Wedsler, supra note 1; AVM.L%cE, op. cit.
supra note 28, at p. 137 et seq.
31. Ordinarily this is done by maintaining the price level at the expense of produc-
tion volume. Statistics seem to indicate that Alcoa again exemplifies monopoly technique.
According to the STATISTIcAL AB STRACT (1935) 673, the yearly average price of alum-
inum in New York during the depression was: 1928--23.90 (cents per pound); 1930-
23.79; 1932-23.30; 1934-21.58. Production dropped in 1930 one-third below the figure
for 1929, and one-third below that in 1931. See The Aluniiom Compan$y of America
(Nov. 1932) FoRTuNE 20.
32. Cf. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106 (1932). In previous antitrust
prosecutions the score in favor of the government has been: 'McReynolds, 12-3; Hughes,
6-2; Brandeis, 8-6; Roberts, 5-3; Stone, 6-5; Butler, 7-8. Reed, Black and Frankfurter,
JJ., have not yet given official voice to their leanings.
33. Cf. United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859 (D. Md. 1916); United
States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 20S Fed. 733 (N. D. Ohio 1913), 217 Fed. 656 (N. D.
Ohio 1914), appeal dimnissed, 245 U. S. 675 (1917). The notorious discrimination be-
tween loose combinations and mergers is doubtless attributable in large measure to the
relative simplicity of dissolving the former. See Hardy, supra note 15.
34. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
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not hesitate to tear down the petroleum empire, for natural lines of cleavage
were clearly marked by the company's internal organization: the key lay
in the destruction of the parent holding company. Since the subsidiaries were
essentially distributing corporations organized on a territorial basis, their
separation into independent units split up the industry sufficiently to allow
the eventual revival of competition. 3  The solution in the Aluminum Com-
pany's case is not nearly so simple; yet its key, too, is suggested in the basis
of the monopoly. If the Company were unable to control the source of
bauxite and the cheap water power sites, it could not maintain its monopoly
without exploiting the dominant position gained through its 100% control
of the smelting process. The power to do this might be reduced beyond the
possibility of abuse by placing the various reduction plants in which virgin
aluminum is produced under the control of separate corporations. So skeletal
an outline, however, fails to reveal the economic and administrative coin-
plexities which beset an attempt at such a reorganization. If a systematic
approach is taken, the Government must decide whether the common denom-
inator which it seeks for the industry should be the most efficient producing
unit or the unit which gives most assurance of the revival of competition, for
the two are by no means coextensive.30 Having assumed one position, it
must then engage in the uncertain process of determining the size of the
desired unit and grapple with the more difficult problem of impressing that
plan upon the existing physical organization of the industry. Should the
Government, on the other hand, abandon the confused realm of economic
theory in favor of a haphazard rearrangement, the tribunal may well with-
hold approval lest the failure of the scheme leave the court responsible for
the collapse of a hitherto profitable industry. Whatever the plan for dissolu-
tion, the technique for dividing the property interests will occasion further
worry. Since the corporation is not a series of integrated concerns, but a
unified whole, the solution does not lie simply in trading shares of stocl, as
in the Standard Oil case. The resulting units will be heterogeneous: some
will be mining corporations, others reducing plants, and so forth, T The
seemingly unattainable goal will have to be a scheme which will combine both
fairness and feasibility in apportioning assets whose dissimilarity implies
varying earning capacity.
For the Court to be sidetracked by these practical difficulties would indeed
be unfortunate from the Government's point of view; the issue of monopoly
per se could hardly be more sharply defined than by the facts of this cae.
By seizing the opportunity to decide that basic question in unequivocal words,
35. But even under such highly favorable conditions, external stimuli were necessary.
See (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 332, 336ff.
36. See HANDLERi, Op. cit. supra note 29, at 149.
37. Alcoa consists at present of the American Bauxite Co., which mines virtually
all United States bauxite; The Aluminum Ore Co., which produces all alumina used in
making the pure aluminum; four smelting plants; and eight finished goods companies.
No plan for dissolution could be effective, of course, unless the first two companies were
broken up in addition to the destruction of the vertical integration. A further difficulty
lies in the fact that the corporation is privately owned, the stock being largely held be-
tween eight estates or individuals. Unless they were made to dispose of their holdings,
any dissolution would be purely nominal. See LAIDLER, 10c. cit. supra note 1.
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the Court could definitely indicate the future course of anti-trust law enforce-
ment. A judgment in favor of the Aluminum Company so grounded would
signify not only adherence to the Court's first faith in "bigness," but also
unqualified repudiation of the Sherman Act as applied to growth by merger
and internal investment. But the Department obviously hopes for a broadly
and generally phrased decision for the Government. By suggesting the extent
to which "natural growth" would be curbed, the case would create substantive
basis for a gradual extension of the prohibition to corporations which, al-
though incomplete monopolies and not apparently guilty of sharp practices,
nevertheless dominate their industries sufficiently to forestall more efficient,
if less profitable, organization. Whichever side the court may chuose, how-
ever, circumstances render it probable that the conclusion will reflect a less
well defined position. In deciding for the Government, the Court could easily
achieve a compromise by couching its opinion in cautious language and em-
phasizing the unique factual basis of 100%o monopoly. Such a decision would
offer no contribution to the meaning of the Act other than its extension to
another relatively rare situation. The attainment of their immediate objective
by such means would provide scant consolation to the Anti-Trust Division for
the loss of an unrivalled opportunity to delineate the hitherto uncertain haun-
daries within which the Act will be applied. On the other land, dismay at
the near impossibility of framing a successful decree might well cause the
Court to give judgment for the Aluminum Company upon a purely practical
basis, whether or not that basis was acknowledged explicitly in the opinion.
While a compromise in this form would be even less satisfactory to the
Department, it would not divest the case of all permanent value, for it would
be tantamount to judicial recognition that the intent of the Sherman Act
cannot be effectuated with existing legal weapons.
SUBROGATION OF PURCHASER TO RIGHTS OF SENIOR MORTGAGEE
AGAINST JUNIOR ENCUmBRANCES*
SUBROGATION is the substitution of one person in the place of another with
reference to a lawful claim or right.' It is purely an equitable doctrine,-
presumably borrowed from the Romans,3 but courts of la, will recognize its
principles.4 The basis for its application is that the prospective subrogee has
-Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F. (2d) 726 (App. D. C. 1937).
1. Boley v. Daniel, 72 Fla. 121, 72 So. 644 (1916) ; Federal Union Life Ins. Co. v.
Deitsch, 127 Ohio St. 505, 189 N. E. 440 (1934) ; see HArems, Sunn'G~ro, (1889) § 1.
2. Massachusetts Hospital Life Ins. Co. v. Shulman, 238 Mass. 119, 12 N. E. (2d)
856 (1938); see Fink v. Mahaffy, 8 Watts 384 (Pa. 1839); SnuEuo:, SunicmAT0
(2d ed. 1893) § 1.
3. See 1 STORY, EQUTrY (18 6) § 635; DiNox, SUBROGATION (1862) 7-20 (setting
forth Roman sources); HAuus, SoumoG.'moz (1889) § 1 (subrogation derived from the
civil law). But see Comment (1933) 31 Micir. L. REv. 826, 819 (questioning Rrman
law as source of subrogation).
4. Boyd v. Finnegan, 3 Daly 222 (N. Y. 1870); SnaEo. Svnor,.%T,,; (2d ed.
1893) § 1.
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assumed or satisfied an obligation for which another is primarily liable.8 By
subrogation, he obtains the rights, priorities, remedies, liens, and securities
of the former obligee.6 A time-honored distinction is made between con-
ventional and legal subrogation. Conventional subrogation arises by express
or implied understanding, and "occurs where one having no interest in or
relation to the matter pays the debt of another and by agreement is entitled
to the securities and rights of the creditor so paid." Legal subrogation is
not dependent upon contract.8 But it constitutes by far the most important
division of the doctrine, for, although it was at first of limited scope, its
possibilities as an equitable remedy were soon realized, and today a respectable
body of opinion sanctions its application in a wide variety of situations. This
flexibility is often epitomized in the statement that legal subrogation is ap-
plicable to all cases where one not a volunteer pays an obligation which in
justice and good conscience ought to have been paid by another.0 But the
test here implied is not broad enough. It is perhaps truer to say that equity
will apply the principle in any case in which justice require., 10 although a
minority of courts deny that the doctrine is benevolent and refuse to adopt
the "liberal" attitude. 1 In theory, the two types of subrogation are supple.
mentary, for underlying legal subrogation is an element of compulsion, ex-
pressed negatively in the exclusion of the "volunteer," and demonstrated by
its historical use to aid a surety who paid the debt of his principal.'- But
5. Offer v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 194 Cal. 114,
228 Pac. 11 (1924). See cases cited infra notes 9 and 10.
6. Page Trust Co. v. Godwin, 190 N. C. 512, 130 S. E. 323 (1925); United States
F. & G. Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Ore. 261, 217 Pac. 332 (1923); cf. Ohio Ins. Co. v.
Winn, 4 Md. Ch. Dec. 253 (1849).
The subrogee is also subject to the defenses against the former obligee. See United
States M. & S. Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske A. OG A. Line, 65 F. (2d) 392, 39
(C. C. A. 2d, 1933); cf. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Farmers' and
Merchants' Bank of Tolu, 223 Ky. 32, 2 S. W. (2d) 1048 (1928).
7. Marianna Nat. Farm Loan Ass'n v. Braswell, 95 Fla. 510, 116 So. 639 (1928);
Boley v. Daniel, 72 Fla. 121, 72 So. 644 (1916); Federal Land Bank v. Barron, 173
Ga. 242, 160 S. E. 228 (1931); Federal Union Life Ins. Co. v. Deitsch, 127 Ohio St.
505, 189 N. E. 440 (1934); cf. Industrial Trust Co. v. Hanley, 53 R. I 180, 165 Atl.
223 (1933). Conventional subrogation is subject to general contract law.
8. Erwin v. Brooke, 159 Ga. 683, 126 S. E. 777 (1925) ; Ross v. Jones, 174 Wash.
205, 24 P. (2d) 622 (1933); HAmus, Siua oArioN (1889) §§ 4, 5.
9. See McCracken County v. Lakeview Country Club, 254 Ky. 515, 524, 70 S. NV.
(2d) 938, 942 (1934); Criswell v. McKnight, 120 Neb. 317, 324, 232 N. W. 586, 589
(1930) ; In re Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank of Nooksack, 175 Wash. 78, 85, 26 P.
(2d) 631, 633 (1933).
10. See Boney v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. of Chicago, 213 N.C. 563, 568, 197 S. E.
122, 126 (1938) ; State v. Citizens' State Bank of Royal, 118 Neb. 337, 343, 224 N. W.
868, 870 (1929) ; cf. Dorrah v. Hill, 73 Miss. 787, 793, 19 So. 961, 962 (1896).
11. See Citizens Mercantile Co. v. Easom, 158 Ga. 604, 611, 123 S. E. 883, 80
(1924). Georgia seems to be having considerable difficulty with subrogation. Compare
Wilkins v. Gibson, 113 Ga. 31, 38 S. E. 374 (1901), with Ragan v. Standard Scale Co%,
128 Ga. 544, 58 S. E. 31 (1907), and with Federal Land Bank v. Barron, 173 Ga. 242,
160 S. E. 228 (1931).
12. That compulsion is an important factor see: Netherton v. Farmers' Exchange
Bank of Gallatin, 228 Mo. App. 296, 63 S. W. (2d) 156 (1933); Bursell v. Morgan,
[Vol. 48
NOTES
since in conventional subrogation an agreement may be implied,"3 and in
legal subrogation the class of persons included within the term "volunteer"
has been reduced,' the dichotomy has in practice lost distinctness.'s
The definitive boundaries within which subrogation may be invoked are
difficult to describe, although the tendency is undoubtedly to extend its field
of useflness.16 But the path of the prospective subrogee is fraught with
peril, for courts have erected numerous conceptual obstacles to tie exercise
of the remedy. A recent liberal case presents a typical fact set-up in which
subrogation has proven useful, and summarizes the legal difficulties confront-
ing one desirous of availing himself of its benefits. 17 One G and his wife,
owners of a plot of land, encumbered the property with three separate deeds
of trust, all of record, as security for three separate loans. Unable to pay
any of these obligations, they conveyed their equity of redemption in fee
simple to D, holder of the second trust deed, representing that the first mort-
gage was the only other encumbrance upon the property. Plaintiff later pur-
chased the land from D, subject to the first trust deed, with the amount
due under that instrument subtracted from the stated purchase price, and
the balance paid in cash to D to apply to the payment, discharge, and release
of the second trust."" There was no mention of the third encumbrance, and
181 Minn. 462, 233 N. V. 12 (1930) ; Chrisman -. Daniel, 278 N. NV. 565 (Neb. 1938) ;
Gersetta Corporation v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 241 N. Y. 418. 150 N. E.
501 (1926) ; Bingham v. Walker Bros., 75 Utah 149, 283 Pac. 1055 (1929): .ongview
School District No. 112 v. Stubbs Electric Co., 160 Wash. 465, 295 Pac. 186 (1931).
The application of subrogation in a suretyship case dates back at least to the 17th
century in the English Chancery with the case of Morgan v. Seymour, 1 Ch. Rep. 120,
21 Eng. Repr. 525 (1637).
13. Mains v. Barnhouse, 209 Iowa 963, 229 N. WV. 218 (1930) ; George A. Hagland
& Co. v. Decker, 118 Neb. 194, 224 N. IV. 14 (1929); Commercial & Farmers' Bfanh
v. Scotland Neck Bank, 158 N. C. 238, 73 S. E. 157 (1911): First State Bank v.
Farmers' & ferchants' Nat. Bank, 262 S. V. 225 (Tem. Civ. App. 1924). Contra:
Hutchinson v. Rice, 105 La. 474, 29 So. 898 (1901) [based on statute, L%. Cxv. CoDE
Axx. (Dart, 1932) art. 2160]; Federal Land Bank v. Barron, 173 Ga. 242, 160 S. E.
228 (1931) semnblc; see Browder & Co. v. Hill, 136 Fed. 821, 823 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905).
14. See note 28, infra.
15. In many cases it is possible to attain subrogation through either rationalization.
Cf. Mains v. Barnhouse, 209 Iowa 963, 229 N. NV 218 (1930); Minton v. Sutton, 109
N. J. Eq. 403, 135 AtI. 693 (1927). One may, of course, contract for subrogation where
it would follow by operation of law anyway. Subrogation may also he mnidified or
abolished by contract. See Bater v. Cleaver, 114 N. J. Law 346, 354, 176 Atl. 88, S92
(1935). When subrogation is discussed, legal subrogation is usually meant.
16. See Emmert v. Thompson, 49 Minn. 386, 391, 52 N. NV. 31, 32 (1892) ; Boney
v. Central Mlut. Ins. Co. of Chicago, 213 N. C. 563, 568, 197 S. E. 122, 124 t 1.19) ;
Martin v. Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 150. 154, 59 P. (2d) 1139, 1140 (1936); 2 Jo'lts.
CHATTEL 'MORTGAGES & COINDITIO-AtL SALFS, (6th ed. 1933) § 659a.
17. Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F. (2d) 726 (App. D. C. 1937).
18. The conveyance by the mortgagor to the mortgagee of the equity ci rcdempton
will not effect a merger if the parties intend otherwise. Factors & T. Ins. Co. Y. Murphy,
111 U. S. 738 (1884); The Bergen, 64 F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933): Guaranty
Trust Co. . Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., 36 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. Sth, 19-9), cert.
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apparently no title search was effected. Some four years later, defendants,
holders of the third deed of trust, instituted foreclosure proceedings and ad-
vertised the property for sale. Plaintiff brought suit to restrain this action,
claiming subrogation to the position of the holder of the second trust deed
in the amount that was paid under that obligation at the time of the purchase.
Defendants contended that, the second trust having been released of record,
the third deed became a second lien to the exclusion of plaintiff's claim. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, after an exhaustive survey
of the authorities, reversed a judgment for defendants and held that the
plaintiff was subrogated to the second lienor's position.10
All courts subscribe to the rule that subrogation will not be permitted a
mere "volunteer."' 20 But there is no general agreement as to the personi-
fication of the word. A minority of courts is prone to call everyone a volunteer
who was not in the position of a surety or who did not have some previous
interest to protect in the subject matter in question. 21 At the other extreme,
the liberal view leads to the result that the only volunteer would be one who,
without an invitation from any other party and purely as a philanthropist,
relieved another from an obligation.22 The court in the principal case, after
citing examples of both strict and liberal construction, concluded that to call
the present plaintiff a volunteer would flout reality. In its opinion a purchaser
who advanced money in the expectation of obtaining a title unencumbered
except for a first lien could hardly be designated an officious intermeddler 2 a
Support can be derived from other specific decisions which have held that
the label does not embrace one who pays another's debt tinder the erroneous
belief that he is liable therefore, 24 nor one who advances money to satisfy
denied, 281 U. S. 756 (1930). The court in the instant case found as a fact that until
the date of the record release by D, it was his intention to preserve the lien for his
own protection.
19. Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F. (2d) 726 (App. D. C. 1937). The court intimated
that its own preference would have dictated a stricter rule of subrogation, but that it
felt itself bound by the liberal views expressed in other federal court decision, i.e.,
Barnes v. Cady, 232 Fed. 318 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); Stowers v. Wheat, 78 F. (2d) 25
(C. C. A. 5th, 1935); Rachal v. Smith, 101 Fed. 159 (C. C. A. 5th, 1900).
20. SHELDON, SuDROGATION (2d ed. 1893) § 240.
21. Federal Land Bank v. Barron, 173 Ga. 242, 160 S. E. 228 (1931); Wiloon v.
Smith, 213 Ky. 836, 281 S. V. 1008 (1926) ; Hinman v. Mason, 149 Va. 267, 136 S. V.
573 (1927) ; cf. Erickson v. Foote, 112 Conn. 662, 153 Atd. 853 (1931) ; Meier v. Planer,
107 N. J. Eq. 398, 152 Ati. 246 (1930).
22. Neer v. Neer, 80 S.W. (2d) 240 (Mo. App. 1935); Nelson v. Nelson, 58
N. D. 134, 226 N. W. 476 (1929) : cf. Rachal v. Smith, 101 Fed. 159, 165 (C. C. A. 5th,
1900). See notes 24 and 25, infra.
23. Cf. Joyce v. Dauntz, 55 Ohio St. 538, 45 N. E. 900 (1896) ; Johnson v. Tootle,
14 Utah 482, 47 Pac. 1033 (1897). Contra: Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Vance, 135 Okla.
24, 245 Pac. 578 (1926).
24. Mfosher v. Conway. 45 Ariz. 463, 46 P. (2d) 110 (1935); Boney v. Central
'Mut. Ins. Co. of Chicago, 213 N. C. 563, 197 S. E. 122 (1938) ; see Coke v. Dargaines,
116 S. W. (2d) 904, 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (payment made tinder erroneous belief
that it was necessary for the protection of an interest).
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an obligation at the request of the debtor. -5 It is, furthermore, possible to
escape the rule by means of an agreement 2 implied in the payor's justifiable
expectations as to his secured position.2 7 Beyond this it may only be added
that the modem tendency is to use the label "volunteer" in an ever narrow-
ing sense.28
Subrogation is universally denied to the party primarily liable.2 The
issue of primariness is brought into relief where, as in the instant case, the
person seeking subrogation is the purchaser of mortgaged property and desires
subrogation with reference to one of the encumbrances. Inquiry must then
be directed to whether the petitioner bought subject to the second encum-
brance, in which case the primary obligation would rest upon anotherao or
whether he assumed that encumbrance, in which case he himself is the primary
obligor.31 When a mortgage is paid as part of the purchase price without a
clear expression of what was intended, courts split as to the proper inter-
pretation of the transaction. The liberal view postulates that that fact alone
is not sufficient to make the purchaser the primary obligor with reference to
the satisfied obligation.32 It is true that the court in the principal case
recognized at least the formal force of the argument that a purchaser who
supplies money to discharge a lien should be treated as if he had assumed
and later discharged the lien as primary obligor. But it pointed out that the
sole reason the plaintiff-purchaser failed to stipulate for a conveyance of the
25. Teal v. Thompson, 180 Ark. 63, 20 S. AV. (2d) 307 (199) ; Baker Y. Farmers'
Bank of Conway, 220 Mfo. App. 85, 279 S. M. 428 (1926) ; Banks Y. Cartwright, 26 S. I.
(2d) 708 (Te. Civ. App. 1930).
26. See note 7, supra.
27. Ingram v. Jones, 47 F. (2d) 135 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Thomas v. Lester,
166 Ga. 274, 142 S. E. 870 (1928); Kuske v. Staley, 138 Kan. 9, 23 P. (2d) 7Z
(1934) ; Prudential Ins. Co. of America Y. Qualset, 116 Neb. 706, 218 N. IV. 734 (1923) ;
Blesse v. Wessels, 18 S. V. (2d) 724 (Te. Civ. App. 1929); In re Farmers' Ez
Merchants' State Bank of Nooksack, 175 Wash. 78, 26 P. (2d) 631 (1933) ; see Wallace
v. Benner, 200 N. C. 124, 130, 156 S. E. 795, 798 (1931). But cf. Federal Land Bank
v. Barron, 173 Ga. 242, 160 S.E. 228 (1931).
28. See Boney v. Central M~ut. Ins. Co. of Chicago, 213 N. C. 563, 508, 197 S. E.
122, 126 (1938) ; 5 Posmoy, Ep2urrr JuRisPRUTDExCE (4th ed. 1919) § 234Sn; Comment
(1938) 24 V.. L. Rzv. 771.
29. SHEr.o-r, SUBROGAmiox (2d ed. 1893) § 46.
30. See 2 JoNEs, MoRTGAGES (Sth ed. 1928) § 911; Snyitox , Sturo .ArIo: (2d ed.
1893) §§26, 28.
31. Duke v. Kilpatrick, 231 Ala. 51, 163 So. 640 (1935); Lamoille County Say.
Bank & T. Co. v. Belden, 90 Vt 535, 98 Atl. 1002 (1916) ; see Laclmwanna Trust & Safe
Dep. Co. v. Gomeringer, 236 Pa. 179, 188, 84 AtI. 757, 760 (1912) ; cf. Winans v. Hare,
46 Okla. 741, 148 Pac. 1052 (1915).
32. Purchaser not primary obligor: Barnes v. Cady, 232 Fed. 313 (C. C.A. 6th,
1916); Capitol Nat. Bank v. Holmes, 43 Colo. 154, 95 Pac. 314 (1903); Williams v.
Libby, 118 'e. 80, 105 AtI. 855 (1919); Joyce Y. Dauntz, 55 Ohio St. 538, 45 IN. E.
900 (1896) ; Johnson v. Tootle, 14 Utah 482, 47 Pac. 1033 (1,97).
Purchaser is primary obligor: Citizens Mercantile Co. v. Easom, 153 Ga. 604,
123 S.E. 883 (1924); Stastny v. Pease, 124 Iowa 587, 100 N. XV. 482 (1904); Smith
v. Feltner, 259 Ky. 833, 83 S.,V. (2d) 506 (1935); -McDowell v. Jones Lumlher Co.,
42 Tex. Civ. App. 260, 93 S. XV. 476 (1906).
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equity of redemption and an assignment of the lien which he was advancing
funds to discharge33-thus completely securing his position-was his ignorance
of the junior encumbrance. And it concluded that equity, in the absence
of intervening considerations, could rectify that mistake by treating the
purchaser as an equitable assignee of the second lien.
The court thus rejected the charge, often interposed as a stumbling block
in the path of the prospective subrogee, that payment of an obligation without
knowledge of intervening liens constitutes negligence.34 Since this negligence
is more often apparent than real, some courts have been led to declare that
only culpable carelessness will be a bar ;3 but such a test would seem to be
of little value. The better opinion ,maintains that negligence is no part of
the problem.3 6 Constructive notice provided by recording statutes has also
been an insurmountable obstacle to some tribunals.37 But again the better
authority holds that the issue of constructive notice is not determinative.38
Rather is the emphasis in both cases upon the correction of a mistake of
fact,39 for which equity is historically adapted, and upon relative equities.
Consonant with the nature of the remedy, an excellent defensive weapon
is supplied by the concept of "action in reliance," and all courts agree that
subrogation may not successfully be invoked where interested parties have,
in good faith, changed their positions in reliance upon the discharge of the
obligation in question.40 This rule, in reality, is merely a specific application
of the more inclusive principle that intervening, superior, or occasionally even
33. See note 18, supra.
34. Cf. Coonrod v. Kelly, 119 Fed. 841 (C. C. A. 3d, 1902); Troyer v. Bank of
De Queen, 170 Ark. 703, 281 S. NV. 14 (1926) ; Boley v. Daniel, 72 Fla. 121, 72 So. 644
(1916); Mather v. Jenswold, 72 Iowa 550, 32 N. W. 512 (1887); Fort Dodge Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Scott, 86 Iowa 431, 53 N.W. 283 (1892).
35. Stephenson v. Grant, 168 Ark. 927, 271 S.W. 974 (1925); M, erchants &
Mechanics' Bank v. Tillman, 106 Ga. 55, 31 S. E. 794 (1898) ; Traders' Bank v. Myers,
3 Kan. App. 636, 44 Pac. 292 (1896); Jackson Trust Co. v. Gilkinson, 105 N. J. Eq.
116, 147 Atl. 113 (Ch. 1929) ; Hill v. Ritchie, 90 Vt. 318, 98 Atl. 497 (1916).
36. Cliffside Park Co. v. Progressive Theatres, 122 N. J. Eq. 109, 192 Atl. 520 (Ch.
1937). See note 39, infra.
37. Stastny v. Pease, 124 Iowa 587, 100 N. W. 482 (1904) ; Goodyear v. Goodyear,
72 Iowa 329, 33 N. W. 142 (1887) ; Kuhn v. National Bank, 74 Kan. 456, 87 Pac. 551
(1906) ; Garwood v. Eldridge, 2 N. J. Eq. 145 (Ch. 1839) ; Conner v. Welch, 51 Wis.
431, 8 N.W. 260 (1881).
38. Shaffer v. McCloskey, 101 Cal. 576, 36 Pac. 196 (1894); Capitol Nat, Bank
v. Holmes, 43 Colo. 154, 95 Pac. 314 (1908); Williams v. Libby, 118 Me. 80, 105 Att.
55 (1919) ; Prestridge v. Lazar, 132 Miss. 168, 95 So. 837 (1923) ; Wilson v. Kimball,
27 N. H. 300 (1853) ; Joyce v. Dauntz, 55 Ohio St. 538, 45 N. E. 900 (1896).
39. Chichi & Lombardo Bldg. Co. v. Herrmann, 121 N. 3. Eq. 252, 189 At!. 625
(Ch. 1937); Williams v. Libby, 118 Me. 80, 105 Atl. 855 (1919); Capitol Nat. Ban!:
v. Holmes, 43 Colo. 154, 95 Pac. 314 (1908).
40. Richards v. Griffith, 92 Cal. 493, 28 Pac. 484 (1891); Ahern v. Freeman, 46
Minn. 156, 48 N. W. 677 (1891): Morris v. Beecher, 1 N. D. 130, 45 N. W. 696 (1I90) ;
Harner's Appeal, 94 Pa. 489 (1880); cf. Holt v. Mitchell, 96 Colo. 412, 43 P. (2d)
388 (1935) ; Joyce v. Dauntz, 55 Ohio St. 538, 45 N. E. 900 (1896) ; Kellogg Brothers
Lumber Co. v. Mularkey, 214 Wis. 537, 252 N. W. 596 (1934).
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equal equities will defeat subrogation. 41 The limitation is undoubtedly sound
and is, in fact, merely the negative of the premise that subrogation will be
applied whenever justice and good conscience require. But it is often invoked
in circumstances where its application would be questionable. Thus in the
situation illustrated by the instant case the argument is usually advanced that
to permit subrogation is to impair materially and unjustly the position of
the junior lienor. It seems clear that this is pure question begging; the
junior ihenor has a right to advance only if the prior encumbrance was paid
by one not entitled to subrogation. Courts which detect this logical fallacy
point out, in addition, that subrogation merely restores the junior lienor to
his original status and that he has no "right" to a better lien position purely
because of another's mistake.
While the instant case deals with encumbrances upon residential property,
similar situations sometimes, though infrequently, occur in the field of rail-
road finance. Where a series of railroad bonds have been or are to be retired
with borrowed money, the problem arises as to whether or not those supply-
ing the funds should be subrogated to the position of the creditors satisfied
as against intervening lienors. The question would arise only where the
security back of the satisfied obligation is cancelled or discharged, or where
the obligation itself has matured.4 In the typical case the relative priorities
are well determined by specific provisions in contract or indenture, and the
junior lienor against whom subrogation is sought usually is fortified by a
provision in the trust indenture addressed to him to the effect that no future
liens will be granted priority over his lien. Any attempt at subrogation by
agreement between the railroad company and a third party would therefore
be a breach of the contract with said junior lienor, and conventional subroga-
tion would probably not be allowed.43 And since in all probability there will
be full knowledge by all parties of all liens and obligations involved so that
a mistake of fact will not be present, legal subrogation would likewise pre-
sumably be denied. But apart from this restrictive tendency in the railroad
field, the liberal view adopted by the federal court in the principal case in
deciding for the plaintiff is certainly in the ascendency. Courts apparently
are adopting the attitude that the prospective subrogee certainly does not
intend to benefit everyone else to his own detriment, and that, if justice
may be served by allowing subrogation, conceptual and formalistic arguments
should not interpose a bar to the granting of relief.
41. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Brunson, 226 Ala. 16, 145 So. 156 (1932);
Stephens v. McCormack, 50 Nev. 383, 263 Pac. .774 (1923); Bell v. Greenwood, 229
App. Div. 550, 242 N. Y. Supp. 149 (2d Dep't 1930); Walker v. Queen Ins. Co., 136
S. C. 144, 134 S. E. 263 (1926); see SnrE.uoN, SUBor.AT0.- (2d ed. 1893) § 4.
42. If the securities are not cancelled, an ordinary transfer, sale, or assignment would
be effected. When the debt itself has matured, some fiction such as subrogation is
necessary to keep it alive after it has been satisfied, the securities being worthless
otherwise even if they are not discharged.
43. See note 41, supra.
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"DOUBLE LIABILITY" OF GARNISHEES RESULTING FROM
FAILURE OF JURISDICTION"
IN legal theory, a garnishee is merely a "disinterested stakeholder,"' but in
fact he must exercise scrupulous vigilance if he is to avoid the risk of serious
damage to his own interests. For when a garnishee turns over to the plain-
tiff or to the court registry the property or credits of the defendant in his
hands, his obligation to his creditor, the defendant, is discharged only if he
does so in obedience to a valid judgment or court order. If, for any reason,
the garnishee could legally have avoided such disbursement, his payment is
considered voluntary2 and is no defense to a subsequent action by the former
defendant.3  Accordingly, if the garnishment proceedings were deficient in
any jurisdictional particular, although the garnishee has once, and apparently
dutifully, paid out the sum owing to the defendant, he may be forced to pay
the same debt a second time.
As in other legal proceedings, such failure of jurisdiction may result from
a multitude of improprieties, many of which are insignificant with respect
to the equities involved and are thereby easily overlooked. But in garnish-
ment actions, which are exclusively statutory in origin, judges are especially
prone to deem vital minute deviations from prescribed procedure. 4 Garnishees
have fallen victim to rulings that incorrect service on the garnishee is a juris-
dictional defect which cannot be waived by appearance. 5 Entering of judg-
ment against the garnishee before judgment against the defendant frequently
eventuates in "double liability" of the garnishee.0 And even 'if the garnish-
*Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Current News Features, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 682 (C, C. A,
8th, 1938).
1. See 2 SHINN, ATrACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT (1900) 838; cf. Simmons v.
Missouri Pac. R. R., 19 Mo. App. 542 (1885).,
2. Balk v. Harris, 122 N. C. 64, 30 S. E. 318 (1898) ; Cole v. Utah Sugar Co,,
35 Utah 148, 99 Pac. 681 (1909). It is only when the garnishee is compelled to pay
by valid process that his payment to the defendant's creditor is construed to be at the
implied request of the defendant. See 2 SHINN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1154, 1155.
3. Bessemer Savings Bank v. Anderson, 134 Ala. 343, 32 So. 716 (1902); Southern
Ry. v. Newton, 106 Ga. 566, 32 S. E. 658 (1899) ; see 2 SHINN, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 1154. See cases cited infra notes 4 to 9. Contra: Katt v. Swartz, 199 Mich. 51, 165
N.W. 717 (1917), cited infra note 28.
4. Emery v. Royal, 117 Ind. 299, 20 N. E. 150 (1889) (justice of the peace failed
to enter the judgment in garnishment on the docket); Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v.
Lake, 5 Ind. App. 450, 32 N. E. 590 (1892) (amount of statutory bond not given on
its face) ; Stimpson v. Malden, 109 Mass. 313 (1872) (writ made returnable several
days too soon) ; Dutcher v. Grand Rapids Fire Ins. Co., 131 Mich. 671, 92 N. W. 345
(1902) (affidavit in alternative and so void).
5. Hebel v. Amazon Ins. Co., 33 Mich. 400 (1876); Pumphrey v. Hunter, 270
S. W. 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; cf. Vittert v. Melton, 78 S. W. (2d) 467 (M o. App.
1935). In almost all other proceedings, jurisdiction over the person, as distinct from
jurisdiction over the subject matter, can be conferred by appearance.
6. Whitcomb v. Atkins, 40 Neb. 549, 59 N.W. 86 (1894); Shoemaker v. Pace,
41 S.W. 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897); see WAP s, ATrACHMENT AND GARNISHIENT
(2d ed. 1895) § 921.
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ment proceedings are themselves impeccably correct, since they are juris-
dictionally dependent on the main cause,7 absence of jurisdiction over the
principal defendant for any reason renders the garnishment void.8
An astonishingly large number of similar predicaments" turn up in the
reports,'0 probably due in the main to the business man's ready compliance
with seemingly authoritative legal mandates, especially when he believes he
has nothing to lose. Doubts must be cast on the efficacy of legal machinery
which allows well-intentioned parties to be so easily lured into fatal con-
ceptual pitfalls. For even large firms, relying on presumably competent legal
counsel, may be trapped.
In 1929, Current News Features, Inc., a non-resident, was sued for libel
in a Missouri court. The plaintiff attempted to secure service by publication
and to garnishee an acknowledged debt of $4000 owed by the Pulitzer Pub-
lishing Co. to Current News. On a court order, the Pulitzer Co. paid that
sum into court. Current News, however, secured the removal of the case to
a federal court, and, on motion, had the service and attachment quashed
because of a technical defect in the publication. Nothing was done with
respect to the money deposited by the garnisheed Pulitzer Co. Accordingly,
the plaintiff in the libel suit instituted another action against Current News
in the same state court, and this time the state court clerk, as an individual,
was summoned as garnishee. Default judgment was entered and the clerk,
complying with a court order, paid the $4000 to the plaintiff. Some time
later, Current News sued the Pulitzer Co. in federal court on the original
debt and was awarded judgment."
The Pulitzer Co. of course entered a defense of payment, claiming that
the placing of the fund in the hands of the court clerk had transferred the
7. Southern Ry. v. Newton, 106 Ga. 566, 32 S. E. 658 (1899); Missouri, K. &
T. Ry. v. Houseley, 37 Okla. 326, 132 Pac. 330 (1913); see cases cited in fra note 8.
But see Simmons v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 19 Mo. App. 542 (1885).
S. Defendant was outside the territorial purview of a court of limited jurisdiction.
Egnatik v. Riverview State Bank, 114 Kan. 105, 216 Pac. 1100 (19231; Ludvickson v.
Severy State Bank, 105 Kan. 225, 182 Pac. 396 (1919). Defendant, a partnership, was
incorrectly sued in firm name. Johnson Mach. Co. v. Watson, 57 Mo. App. 629 (1S94).
Defendant had died before judgment Loring Y. Fulger, 73 Mass. 505 (1856). Defendant
had never been served with process. Vaselopolous v. Hackley Nat. Bank, 220 Mich.
681, 190 N. AV. 624 (1922) ; First State Bank of Addington Y. Lattimer, 48 Okla. 104,
149 Pac. 1099 (1915).
9. E.g., the defendant in the principal proceedings was not the garnishee's actual
creditor. State v. Grugett, 228 Mo. App. 8, 63 S. \V. (2d) 413 (1933). The garnish-
ment proceedings were based on a judgment already assigned, although at the time
he paid, the garnishee had no notice of the assignment. Brown v. Ayres, 33 Cal. 525
(1867). Property sought to be garnished was exempt from attachment. Upper Blue
Bench Irrigation Dist. v. Continental Nat. Bank, 93 Utah 325, 72 P. (2d) 1048 (1937).
The proceedings against the defendant were void for want of jurisdiction over the subjcct
matter. Drake v. DeSilva, 124 App. Div. 95, 108 N. Y. Supp. 1039 (3d Dep't 1903);
Stewart v. Northern Assurance Co., 45 \ V. Va. 734, 32 S. E. 218 (1893).
10. See Note (1927) 49 A. L. P. 1411, in which 43 such cases are cited.
11. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Current News Features, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 632 (C. C.
A. th, 1938).
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ownership of the fund to Current News, and that the second state court suit
was an adjudication of such ownership, binding on Current News. The court,
however, sustained the position of Current News that it had never owned
the $4000, and held that there had been no adjudication of the question since
the second state court suit was void. First, it was said, the garnishment
process should have been served on the court clerk in his official capacity ;'-
secondly, the court never acquired quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the non-
resident Current News since Current News did not in fact own the funds
attached.1 3 While this reasoning seems circular, 4 the court's conclusion that
the funds still belonged to the Pulitzer Co. is supported by authority t and
by a persuasive conceptual argument that the transfer of money by the
Pulitzer Co. was a bare bailment to the clerk as a private person.10 No other
significance could be lent to this transaction by the supposed court order,
which was technically non-existent. Moreover, as the Pulitzer Co. was a
debtor of Current News rather than a bailee of the fund, the funds bailed with
the clerk could not be said to be the property of Current News.
It is possible to argue otherwise, 17 but even if the judgment in the second
state court suit, declaring Current News' ownership, could be supported, the
Pulitzer Co. in seeking to take advantage of it as res judicata would run into
a conceptual contradiction. Following orthodox doctrine, to be entitled to
plead the judgment the Pulitzer Co. would have to establish its privity to
12. There is little or no authority in the reports for this holding. In theory, there
had been no deposit in the registry of the court, since the only way that could have
been brought about was by a valid court order. People v. Cobb, 10 Colo. App. 478,
51 Pac. 523 (1897) ; Texas & P. Ry. v. Walker, 93 Tex. 611, 57 S. W. 568 (1900). And
the order to pay in the first state court suit was, like everything else in that suit, nuga-
tory for want of jurisdiction.
13. There is universal support for this view. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877)
Kennedy v. Schleindl, 290 Pa. 38, 137 Atl. 815 (1927).
14. Le., the money may not be said to belong to Current News because the state
court had no jurisdiction; and the court had no jurisdiction because the money did not
belong to Current News.
15. Brandt v. Rabenstein, 31 Ohio Circ. Ct. 48 (1908) ; Yeiser v. Cathers, 73 Neb.
317, 102 N. W. 612 (1905). An unauthorized payment to a clerk of court is not a pay-
ment to one's creditor. Texas & P. Ry. v. Walker, 93 Tex. 611, 57 S. W. 568 (1900) ;
Whitesboro v. Diamond, 75 S. W. 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903). All of the cases cited
in notes 4 to 9, supra, in which the garnishee delivered funds to a court official, are
implicitly based on this principle.
16. See note 12, supra.
17. E.g., the delivery of money to the clerk during the first state court suit was to
the use of either the plaintiff in that suit or of Current News. Consequently, since Cur-
rent News could have sued the court clerk in his private capacity for money had and
received after that suit was quashed [Hunt v. Milligan, 57 Ind. 141 (1877) ; cf. Deal v.
Mississippi County Bank, 79 Mo. App. 262 (1899)] the money may be said to have been
the property of Current News, and the state court accordingly acquired jurisdiction over
Current News when the funds were attached. Further, the clerk was properly gar-
nisheed as an individual, since the criterion of whether a person can be garnisheed is
whether the defendant could sue him at law for the property or debt sought so to be
attached. Atwood v. Hale, 17 Mo. App. 81 (1885); 2 SHiNN, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 849.
such judgment, and privity could arise in this situation only if the garnishee
were the bailee of the Pulitzer Co.' 8 And so to be in a position to maintain
that Current News was bound by the adjudication that the $4000 belonged
to it, the Pulitzer Co. would be forced to assert that it had been itself the
owner of the fund.'9
Technically, then, the instant decision can not be criticized, despite the
patently unfair result. It is quite on a par with the numerous other holdings
resulting in "double liability." It must further be admitted that had the
Pulitzer Co. or its attorneys acted with exceeding prudence, double payments
might have been avoided. At the outset, the Pulitzer Co. should have ascer-
tained whether jurisdiction had been competently acquired over Current News
before parting with any funds. This could have been done by examining the
affidavit and return accompanying the order of publication, or by communi-
cating with Current News. Communication has, in fact, been held to be
the garnishee's duty to his creditor.2 0 Having discovered the irregularity,
the Pulitzer Co. was privileged,21 or even under a "duty,"22 to plead to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Once caught in the tangle, escape was much more difficult, but speculation
suggests a few possible expedients. After the first state court suit had been
quashed in the federal court, the Pulitzer Co. might have moved in the federal
court for the return of the money delivered to the state court clerk. While
the federal court would have no jurisdiction over the state court clerk as
an individual, and consequently could not issue an authoritative order against
18. It would be fruitless to claim that the clerk was the Pulitzer Co.'s agent, since
the Missouri rule is that the garnishment of property in the hands of an agent of de-
fendant's debtor is void. Provenchers v. Reifess, 62 261o. App. 50 (1895).
19. Although the absolute requirement of privity has been once repudiated [Coca-
Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 Atl. 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934)], that decision would
be of questionable support to the Pulitzer Co. here. The holding vas that the plea of
res judicata may be raised by one not a party to the prior suit against the plaintiff in
that prior suit, and it is doubtful whether this principle would, or should, be extended
against a defendant in a prior suit which went by default.
20. It has been held that a garnishee, to be entitled to set up a prior judgment in
garnishment proceedings as a defense to an action by the former defendant, must prove
he has discharged his duty to his creditor (the defendant) by giving him notice of the
suit and by interposing any available defense. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Crews, 51 Olda.
144, 151 Pac. 879 (1915); see Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215. 228 (1905); Stewart v.
Northern Assur. Co., 45 V. Va. 734, 741, 32 S. E. 218, 220 (1S98) ; Morgan v. Neville,
74 Pa. 52, 57 (1873).
21. Vittert v. Melton, 78 S. XV. (2d) 467 (Mo. App. 1935); see First Nat. Bank
of Palatine v. Hahnemann Inst. of Chicago, 356 Ill. 366, 370, 190 N. E. 707, 709 (1934).
22. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Crews, 51 Okla. 144, 151 Pae. 879 (1915); see State
v. Grugett, 228 -Mo. App. 8, 13, 63 S. AV. (2d) 413, 416 (1933). The garnishee really
owes the duty to himself, since he submits to the jurisdiction of the court at his own
peril. But cf. Simmons v. Missouri P. R. R., 19 Mo. App. 542 (1M35), where the gar-
nishee resisted payment on the plea of no jurisdiction over the defendant, and appealed
adverse judgments twice. The court, stating that'the garnishee has a duty of indiffer-
ence between the contending parties, held that where he admits indebtedness but delays
the plaintiff in his recovery, he ought, if unsuccessful, to pay damages for ve.atious
appeals.
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him,23 its pronouncement that the money should be paid back to the Pulitzer
Co. would probably be respected by the clerk. Even without such assistance,
the Pulitzer Co. might have requested the clerk to return the funds. If he
refused, the Company could, with some basis in authority, have brought
suit in the state court for money had and received, 24 although such an action
seems never to have been conceived. Certainly, the clerk would not be able
to offer a valid judgment or order to justify his disinclination to reimburse
the garnishee. Even the disbursement by the clerk to the plaintiff in the
state court action may not have ended the Pulitzer Co.'s opportunities, since
it might conceivably have maintained a similar action against the plaintiff
to recover funds which in equity and conscience belonged to it.25 Perhaps,
indeed, this course remained open after the judgment in the principal case.
But whatever may be the conceptual possibilities of recourse by the garnishee
against court clerk or plaintiff, the practical inadequacy of such relief is in-
dicated by the fact that there appears to be but one case in the reports in
which it has even been sought.20 Nor are admonitions for the use of care
a solution to the ever-recurring problem of "double liability," since they will
never reach the small business man who complies with garnishment process
without consulting a lawyer.27 Of course, under the existing state of the
law, the numerous technicalities surrounding garnishment afford but little
protection to the defendant, who is often victimized by the use of interstate
garnishment as a device to shift the place of trial. But this problem raises
a host of issues which are outside the scope of this note, the primary concern
of which is to point to the need for some modification of the law whereby
a garnishee, who in good faith cooperates with the court machinery, will be
protected against his own honest inadvertance. One court, defying theoretical
difficulties, has filled the gap by holding that where, by statute, payment into
court under a court order absolves the garnishee of all further liability, such
payment shall have that effect regardless of whether the court order was
23. Whitesboro v. Diamond, 75 S. W. 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
24. Money paid under a void judgment or decree can be recovered, since it was
paid under the erroneous belief that there was a decree requiring its payment, which
is deemed a mistake of fact, not of law. Simmons v. Simmons, 91 W. Va. 32, 112 S. E
189 (1922) ; Lichtwadt v. Murphy's Adm'r, 182 Ky. 490, 206 S. W. 771 (1918). But cf.
West v. Brown, 165 Ga. 187, 140 S. E. 500 (1927) ; Pardue v. Absher, 174 N. C. 676,
94 S. E. 414 (1917). A court officer is personally liable for funds received without the
authority of a valid court order. See cases cited supra note 17; Note (1929) 59 A, L. R.
83.
25. See cases cited in note 24 supra; cf. Pumphrey v. Hunter, 270 S. W. 237 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925). It is well settled that a party who has paid on a judgment is entitled
to restitution, or to sue for money had and received, when the judgment is reversed.
Haebler v. Myers, 132 N. Y. 363, 30 N. E. 963 (1892) ; Florence Cotton and Iron Co. v.
Louisville Banking Co., 138 Ala. 588, 36 So. 456 (1903).
26. Pumphrey v. Hunter, 270 S. W. 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). When the original
defendant sued the garnishee on the ground that the garnishment proceedings were
void, the garnishee entered a cross-action against the original plaintiff. The court inti-
mated such action was maintainable, but dismissed it for extraneous procedural reaonls,
27. See Clark and Corstvet, The Lawz, er and the Public (1938) 47 YALU L. 3,
1272, 1282-1285.
[Vol. ,48
rendered with jurisdiction.28  The justice of the peace or court clerk who
receives the money is held officially accountable to the garnishee's creditor,
the defendant, thus assuring him adequate protection. Although other courts
have refused to lend identical statutes such an effect,O it is probable that if
a remedial statute were specifically to provide for discharge of liability even
where the court order is "void", all courts would allow it its intended mean-
ing. It should be noted, on the other hand, that the necessary consequence
of such a proposal is to shift on to the court official the possibly unfair respon-
sibility of determining whether jurisdiction has been acquired over tle prin-
cipal defendant. Further, unless the court official is bonded, a right of action
against him will be a poor substitute for the defendant's present right of
action against the garnishee, who is much less likely to be an impecunious
party.
Instead, then, of adopting measures which transfer the burden of the
hazard of "double liability" on to the defendant or court officer, it would be,
in all likelihood, most equitable to impose the cost of the risk on the plain-
tiff, who alone profits from the use of garnishment process. This could be
accomplished by a statutory requirement that the plaintiff post a bond to
indemnify the garnishee against the existence of some jurisdictional deficiency
which would expose the garnishee to a later suit by the defendant. ° 'Not
only would this provide a thoroughgoing safeguard for the garnishee, but
it would probably lead to a salutary diminution in the use of garnishment
as a means of oppressing debtors.
DisPosITioN OF ILLEGALLY COLLECTED SALES TA.x R.ECEIPTS-
THE proper distribution of tax proceeds collected under invalid statutes or
regulations has in recent years propounded a significant problem. Improper
levy and assessment of sales taxes present particularly difficult issues, for,
instead of the customary two-party litigation, a tri-partite conflict may arise.
The taxing authority, which has or demands possession of the funds, the
consumer or purchaser, who originally paid the tax, and the merchant or
retailer, who collected the proceeds, may all solicit protection from the courts.
In reality, although the interest of the individual purchaser is often mentioned
with grave concern, he rarely appears personally in the litigation,' but the
28. Katt v. Swartz, 199 'Mich. 51, 165 N. AV. 717 (1917).
29. The principal case is illustrative. The court ignored Mo. ST, T. ANN- (Vernon,
1932) §§ 1403, 1415. Cf. Ludvickson v. Severy State Bank, 105 Kan. 225, 182 Pae. 396
(1919); Egnatik v. Riverview State Bank, 114 Kan. 105, 216 Pac. 11O (1923); KA:.
Gmr. STAT. ANK.. (1935) 60-960.
30. Although the usual garnishment bond has as its primary purpose the protec-
tion of the defendant from injury through wrongful garnishment, the bund may h con-
ditioned on damage to the garnishee as well.
*Kesbec, Inc. v. McGoldrick, 278 N. Y. 293, 16 N. E. (2d) 288 (1938).
1. The total tax payments of a given consumer are usually too minute to warrant
suit. Even when he is desirous of proving his claim, he is generally unable to do so,
either because he failed to pay under protest, or because he did not save the evidence
necessary to substantiate his assertions.
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concept of the three-sided struggle is maintained by the representations of
the retailer that he is demanding a refund or refusing delivery of the receipts
as the protector of the purchaser's interest. In opposition, the taxing authority
protests that it alone should possess the funds, on the ground that the retailer
has no beneficial interest in his collections.2
An approach frequently adopted in disposing of improperly collected moneys
is illustrated by a recent New York decision.3 Subsequent to a declaration
that part of a New York City gasoline sales tax4 had been invalidly assessed,5
a retailer sued the comptroller for a refund of his collections deposited with
that official pursuant to the statute.0 The Appellate Division, reviewing a
finding of the comptroller, held that since a void act or law can create
neither rights nor duties, the petitioner was under no obligation to collect
a tax "void ab initio" and similarly under no compulsion to remit collections
to the comptroller.1 The order directing a refund to the depositor was
reversed by the Court of Appeals. That court stated that the petitioner was
merely an agent of the city and was therefore not entitled to funds collected
for its principal. And it argued further that since the statutory provision
for a direct remedy by purchasers against the comptroller presumably ab-
solved the retailer from liability to its customers, it had no beneficial interest
in the money. A three-judge minority, vigorously dissenting, pointed out
that their prevailing colleagues had unnecessarily thrown the loss of the illegal
2. The typical sales statute levies the tax directly upon the purchaser and not upon
the retailer, who is merely the collector. Quite different problems arise where the legis-
lation imposes the tax directly upon the retailer, or where the court interprets the
statute to be of the "processing type." Here the retailer is usually allowed recovery.
Purchasers are permitted neither to intervene in the adjudication of the retailer's claim
nor to recover independently from the state. Yet they may compel a retailer obtaining
a refund to reimburse them to the extent that the tax burden has been shifted. See
Johnson, A. A. A. Refunds: A Study in Tax Incidence (1937) 37 CoL., L. Rnv. 910;
(1937) 5 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 152; (1937) 50 HAiv. L. REv. 477. Although a sales tax
is levied upon purchasers, a retailer, because of competition, may absorb a portion or
all of the tax through price reduction. See HAIG AND Snoup, THE SA s TAX IN Tlu
AMERIeAN STATEs (1934) 358, 526; Legis. (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 860.
3. Kesbec, Inc. v. McGoldrick, 278 N. Y. 293, 16 N. E. (2d) 288 (1938); (1938)
52 HAuv. L. REv. 330; (1938) 18 B. U. L. REv. 790; (1938) 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 242.
4. City of New York, Local Law No. 24, published as No. 25, of 1934, p. 164,
5. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N. Y. Supp. 288
(1st Dep't 1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y. 668, 5 N. E. (2d) 385 (1936). The court held that
a retailer had sufficient interest to contest the validity of the assessment, since the statute
compels the retailer to pay the tax if his customers do not. City of New York, Local
Law No. 24, published as No. 25, of 1934 § 15, p. 173. But it has been held that a
retailer has insufficient interest to contest the legality of a sales tax. Wade v, State,
97 Colo. 52, 47 P. (2d) 412 (1935); Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.
(2d) 1016 (1935) ; Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 3 F. Supp. 189 (S. D. Iowa 1933),
aff'd, 292 U. S. 86 (1934).
6. Although these funds were in petitioner's possession when the assessment was
declared invalid, the statute required that petitioner deposit the money with the comptroller
in order to contest the comptroller's order that the receipts rightfully belonged to the
state. City of New York, Local Law No. 24, published as No. 25, of 1934, § 7, p. 169.
7. Kesbec, Inc. v. Taylor, 253 App. Div. 353, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 241 (1st Dep't 1938).
assessment upon either the consumers or the retailers. Consumers could
not recover from the state, since the one year statutory period within which
tax refund actions could be instituted8 had already elapsed. Thus the burden
of the invalid assessment fell upon the purchasers unless they were allowed
subsequent recovery from the merchants." The dissent would have preferred
a prior interpretation of the statute in question wherein the retailer had been
designated a taxpayer and not an agent of the taxing authority 0 and under
which the petitioner would have been allowed a refund."'
Results in similar cases have in large part been determined by the fortuitous
circumstance of whether or not the proceeds have been turned over to the
taxing authority at the time the statute or regulation is declared invalid. Where
the money is in the sovereign's possession, courts have frequently used ver-
balistic techniques similar to that adopted in the instant case. Denial of
recovery to retailers has been based upon the doctrines that the plaintiff is
a "volunteer collector," estopped from recovery from one for whose benefit
he acted ;12 that, since he has not repaid his purchasers, the retailer would
be unjustly enriched and therefore comes into court with unclean hands ;1O
that the state has not consented to be sued ;14 that the collector, apart from
any doctrine of agency, has insufficient interest to contest the state's reten-
tion of the funds ;'1 and that the petitioner did not pay the tax involuntarily
and under protest.' 6 Courts may renounce such rationalizations, however,
8. City of New York, Local Law No. 24, published as No. 25, of 1934, § 10,
p. 171.
9. Although petitioner's brief on motion for reargument stressed the fact that the
decision allowed the tax officials to collect indirectly what they could not collect directly,
the motion was denied. N. Y. L. J., Oct. 13, 1938, p. 1094, col. I.
10. Matter of Atlas Television Co., 273 N. Y. 51, 6 N. F. (2d) 94 (1936). The
United States Supreme Court adopted this interpretation of the same statute in New
York City v. Goldstein, 299 U. S. 522 (1937), rev'g, In re Lazaroff, 84 F. (2d) 932
(C. C.A. 2d, 1936).
11. It appears that petitioner kept a record of some sales and therefore could reim-
burse these purchasers. The dissent also stressed the fact that the decision bars recovery
from the city by purchasers from other retailers, who bought on charge accounts and
thus had evidence to substantiate their claims. See Kesbec, Inc. v. 'McGoldricl, 278
N. Y. 299, 301, 16 N. E. (2d) 288, 291 (1938).
12. Richardson Lubricating Co. v. Kinney, 337 IlL 122, 16S N. E. 86 (1929);
cf. Chicago v. Burke, 226 Ill. 191, 80 N. E. 720 (1907); Cummings v. Chicago, 248
Ill. 392, 94 N. E. 46 (1911).
13. Shannon v. Hughes & Co., 270 Ky. 530, 109 S. W. (2d) 1174 (1937); Standard
Oil Co. v. Bollinger, 337 I1. 353, 169 N. E. 236 (1929) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Bollinger,
348 Ill. 82, 180 N. E. 396 (1932).
14. Flower v. State, 65 Misc. 145, 121 N. Y. Supp. 96 (CL Ci. 1909), aff'd, 143
App. Div. 871, 128 N. Y. Supp. 208 (3d Dep't 1911).
15. O'Connell v. Frost, 73 P. (2d) 87 (Ariz. 1937). Contra: Standard Oil Co. v.
State, 283 Mich. 85, 276 N. V. 908 (1937) ; cf. Van Antwerp v. State, 218 N. Y. 422,
113 N. E. 497 (1916).
16. Roxana Petroleum Corp. . Bollinger, 54 F. (2d) 296 (C. C.A. 7th, 1931),
cert. denied, 286 U. S. 554 (1932); Agni Motor Fuel Co. v. Kinney, 340 Ill. 17, 172
N. E. 39 (1930). For discussions of the requirement of compulsory payment under
protest see Sclove, Reftads and Recovery of Slate Taxes (1935) 41 V. VA. L Q.
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when the retailer has kept accurate records and presumably will distribute the
refund to his purchasers. 17 Where, on the other hand, retailers have retained
possession of their collections, they are generally able to resist attempts to
obtain them by the state.' 8 In this situation, the agency doctrine espoused
by the majority in the principal case is either modified by an averment that
the collector is an involuntary agent against whom the state has no right of
recovery,19 or entirely abandoned with the assertion that a void act can
create neither rights nor duties. 20 And it has been held that since the state
is not an injured party, it may not be permitted to share in the gains made
by the dealer's misrepresentation to his purchasers of the validity of the tax.2 1
On the relatively few occasions upon which the consumer enters directly
into the litigation, 22 the issues take on added complexity. Should his statutory
action against the taxing authority fail despite his preservation of evidence
tending to prove payment,23 he might proceed against the tax-collecting
retailer. A quasi-contractual action for money had and received would
348, 362; (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 662; (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L. REv. 920; Notes
(1927) 48 A. L. R. 1381; (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1301.
17. Benzoline Motor Fuel Co. v. Bollinger, 353 Ill. 600, 187 N. E. 657 (1933),
cf. Van Antwerp v. State, 218 N. Y. 422, 113 N. E. 497 (1916) (broker allowed refund
as trustee for his customers).
18. Newlin v. Liberty Oil Co., 167 La. 831, 120 So. 383 (1929); Moore v, Eastmait
Gardiner Lumber Co., 156 Miss. 359, 126 So. 44 (1930); State v. Sunburst Refining
Co., 76 Mont. 472, 248 Pac. 186 (1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 722 (1926); Henry
County v. Standard Oil Co., 167 Tenn. 485, 71 S. W. (2d) 683 (1934). Contra: Xrade
v. State, 97 Colo. 52, 47 P. (2d) 412 (1935) ; Spencer v. Consumers Oil Co., 115 Cont.
554, 162 Atl. 23 (1932) ; cf. People ex rel. Martin v. Brown, 55 N. Y. 180 (1873).
19. State v. Sunburst Refining Co., 76 Mont. 472, 248 Pac. 186 (1926), cerl. denied,
273 U. S. 722 (1926).
20. Henry County v. Standard Oil Co., 167 Tenn. 485, 71 S. W. (2d) 683 (1934);
cf. Newlin v. Liberty Oil Co., 167 La. 831, 120 So. 383 (1929) (no evidence to prove
retailer passed tax on to customers).
21. State v. Sunburst Refining Co., 76 Mont. 472, 248 Pac. 186 (1926), cert. denied,
273 U. S. 722 (1926). In Moore v. Eastman Gardiner Lumber Co., 156 Miss. 359,
126 So. 44 (1930), an action of escheat by the state to recover money collected by the
retailer was dismissed as improper.
22. See note 1, supra. And should the court interpret the sales tax to be of the
"processing" type, it would deny that the purchaser has sufficient interest to intervene
for the refund. Cf. Acme-Evans Co. v. Smith, 13 F. Supp. 356 (S. D. Ind. 1936);
Washburn Crosby Co. v. Nee, 13 F. Supp. 751 (f. D. Mo. 1936).
23. In the absence of a statute the purchaser generally may not recover if lie did
not pay under protest. Flower v. State, 65 Misc. 145, 121 N. Y. Supp. 96 (Ct. Cl.
1909), aff'd,.143 App. Div. 871, 128 N. Y. Supp. 208 (3d Dep't 1911); see note 16,
supra. See also Richardson Lubricating Co. v. Kinney, 337 I1. 122, 130, 168 N. E. 886,
889 (1929); cf. (1933) 67 U. S. L. REv. 4. But, since the taxing ordinance in the
instant case specifically provided for refunds, and no mention was made of the necessity
for protest at payment, purchasers could probably recover without this formality. People
ex rel. Noyes v. Sohmer, 81 Misc. 522, 143 N. Y. Supp. 475 (Sup. Ct. 1913), afj'd,
159 App. Div. 929, 143 N. Y. Supp. 1138 (3d Dep't 1913), aff'd, 210 N. Y. 619, 104




probably be successful against a merchant who had obtained a refund of his
tax collections or who had not yet paid them to the state.2 4 If the retailer
does not possess the funds, the consumer might frame his suit in terms of
agency, claiming that the retailer acted on behalf of the state.P A collector
of taxes illegally levied or assessed may be said to be personally liable because
he proceeded without the authority and protection of his principal.-Y On the
other hand, in jurisdictions where, because of an ambiguous statute,- the
retailer may justifiably maintain that he acted as the purchaser's agent,23 he
might conceivably be sued on the theory that the scope of his authority was
confined to collecting and paying a constitutional tax.20
But these rationalizations leave the substantial questions untouched and
may with almost equal facility be marshalled on behalf of either litigant.
Workable remedies to eliminate confusion have yet to be propounded. Pro-
cedures for forestalling the problem by a determination of the validity of the
levy or assessment before any funds have been collected are neither univer-
sally available nor entirely satisfactory. Advisory opinions are never binding
on courts in subsequent adjudications of actual controversies. 0 Declaratory
judgments fail to solve the difficulty, for the emergency character of most
sales taxes inevitably results in the collection of some funds before such a
judgment can be procured. And the utility of an injunction against tax col-
lection is seriously impaired by the requirements that the petitioner show
24. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Rosier, 104 Kan. 719, 180 Pac. 807 (1919); Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. Allen, 82 Fla. 191, 89 So. 555 (1921); see Van Antverp v. State,
218 N. Y. 422, 429, 113 N. E. 497, 499 (1916). But presumably such an action would
not be successful if the retailer had paid the money to the taxing authority and had
not obtained a refund. See Christopher v. Hoger & Co., 160 Misc. 21, 22, 299 N. Y. Supp.
105, 106 (Mfunic. Ct. 1936).
25. The state may make a retailer a tax collector in return for the privilege of
doing business within the state. Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 3 F. Supp. 189 (S. D.
Iowa 1933), aff'd, 292 U. S. 86 (1934); Pennsylvania v. York Silk Mfig. Co., 192
Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); cf. Stahmann v. Vidal, 59 Sup. Ct. 41 (U. S. 1938); Breaux
Ballard, Inc. . Shannon, 271 Ky. 553, 112 S. AV. (2d) 996 (1938); Covington v. State
Tax Comm., 257 Ky. 84, 77 S. NV. (2d) 386 (1934).
26. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); International Paper Co. v. Burrill,
260 Fed. 664 (D. Mass. 1919); Kittredge v. Boyd, 136 Kan. 691, 18 P. (2d) 563
(1933) ; Atlantic Pharmacal Co. v. Comm'r of Corp. & Taxation, 2 N. E. (2d) 474
('Mass. 1936); see Bondurant, The Windfall Tax (1939) 37 Mxcir. L. Rm. 357, 363.
But cf. Anniston IMfg. Co. v. Davis, 87 F. (2d) 773 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), aff'd, 301 U. S.
337 (1937) ; Chappell v. Morris, 247 Ky. 476, 57 S. ,V. (2d) 486 (1933) ; see 3 CooLEY,
TA..xATio- (4th ed. 1924) § 1299; 4 CooLEYn, TAxATiOx (4th ed. 1924) § 1629; Field,
Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes (1932) 45 Hiv. L. RE%. 501, 519;
(1920) 29 YALE L. J. 574.
27. If the court interprets the statute to be of the "processing" type, tle purchaser's
right of recovery will of course depend upon his sales contract. Te.xas Co. v. Harold,
228 Ala. 350, 153 So. 442 (1933); see note 2, supra.
28. See Van Antwerp v. State, 218 N. Y. 422, 429, 113 N. E. 497, 499 (1916).
29. But the counter argument that the parties were laboring under a mutual mistake
of fact could easily prevail.
30. See THA-.FYR, LaGa. EssAYs (1908) 42; Frankfurter, A Nrote on Adisor,
Opinions (1924) 37 H1Av. L. REv. 1002.
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irreparable injury and prove the absence of an adequate remedy at law in the
nature of a statutory provision for recovery.31
Preventive relief being inadequate, the disposition of the collections is
almost certain to be contested. The most, obvious proposal to facilitate this
distribution is to require merchants to keep accurate and complete records
of all purchases. The state could thus ascertain the actual taxpayers and,
upon a declaration of invalidity, repay directly the portion of the tax borne
by each consumer. This presumably would be the most equitable resolution
of the conflict, and it would have .the additional advantage of preventing
costly litigation for refunds. But the practical value of such a plan is doubtful.
It would necessitate keeping records of countless small sales for an inde-
terminate period. The benefits thus attained by ascertaining actual taxpayers
in the rare case of an invalid levy or assessment would probably not justify
the great economic waste involved.
In default of a comprehensive accounting system, the social and economic
arguments are as inconclusive as the legal doctrines. The retailer may attempt
to bolster his claim to the refund by contending that, although the tax has
been paid by the consumer, he, too, has borne a share of the burden by
defraying the expense of collecting and accounting for the levy. Because of
price increases resulting from the tax, he may have suffered a decrease in
sales with consequent loss of profits,3 2 and he may argue further that the
tax has meant a reduction in the total amount available for the purchase
of all goods, further decreasing total turnover.33 It is said that the loss of
potential profit to the merchant gives him some interest in the illegally col-
lected funds, whereas the state, wholly uninjured by its void assessment or
levy, can display no such basis for its claim.34
The argument is vulnerable. While it is true that the tax has meant an
increase in price, it has been levied equally on all merchants within its scope
and therefore no competitive disadvantage has been conferred upon any par-
ticular individual. 35 The price increase is so slight that it will deter few people
from purchases and, hence, affects profits but little. The argument that the
exaction has destroyed total income is fallacious, since it has not destroyed
purchasing power, but has merely transferred it through the medium of state
expenditures. 36 Although concededly some check should be placed upon
31. Rio Oil & Supply Co. v. Duce, 85 Colo. 287, 275 Pac. 902 (1929); see Field,
Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes (1932) 45 HAv. L. REV. 501; (1934)
19 CoRN. L. Q. 607. Despite a statutory provision for a refund, a class suit by tax-
payers to enjoin the enforcement of a tax, allegedly illegal, may be successful if the
court is convinced that the injunction will avoid a multiplicity of suits. Gramling v,
Maxwell, 52 F. (2d) 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931).
32. See BUEHLER, GENERAL SALES TAXATION (1932) 237.
33. Merchants also complain that customer resentment against these "nuisance"
taxes decreases sales. See HAIG AND SHoup, THE SALES TAX IN rH AmERCAN STATES
(1934) 328.
34. This argument was rejected in Shannon v. Hughes & Co., 270 Ky. 530, 109
S.W. (2d) 1174 (1937).
35. But retailers may lose sales to neighboring merchants in tax free areas. See
HAIG AND SHouP, THE SALES TAX IN THE AmERICAN STATES (1934) 326.
36. See KING, PUBLIC FINANCE (1935) 36.
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possible misuse of the taxing power, better means are available than dumping
the entire tax into the retailer's lap.3 7
Perhaps the best solution would be to allow the retailer to retain funds
collected but not yet remitted and to refund to him payments already made.
Instead of imposing a new levy upon consumers, forcing them to bear the
burden of taxation twice to meet a single need, the legislature might then
levy an unjust enrichment or "windfall" tax, assessing a certain percentage
of that portion of the retailer's net income derived from withholding his
refund from the actual taxpayers.3s The state would thus be able to obtain
the required funds, and despite strict statutes of limitations,30 the interests
of all purchasers who kept records of their payments would be protected.
The portion of the refund remaining with the retailer would recompense him
for the expenses incurred in collecting the tax.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION'*
UxusuAL issues of international ex-tradition have been posed by variations
in the criminal laws of different nations. The basic problem of double crim-
inality-the principle that the acts of the accused must be proscribed by the
criminal codes of both nations-has been often litigated and extensively
treated.' A less frequently recurring aspect of the same question, arising by
virtue of the requirement that the fugitive's acts be considered criminal at
the time extradition is requested, involves the statutes of limitations of both
37. Perhaps the reductio ad absurdum of the argument is the assertion that the
refusal to refund'the tax to the retailers offers the legislature a panacea for the un-
balanced budget. It is claimed that the return of the collections to the merchant presents
the only effective deterrent to repeated abuses of the power to tax.
38. The constitutionality of such a tax imposed by the federal government has
been upheld. White Packing Co. v. Robertson, 89 F. (2d) 775 (C. C.A. 4th, 1937);
Kingan & Co. v. Smith, 16 F. Supp. 549 (S. D. Ind. 1936). And the Supreme Court has
sustained a statute, enacted after collections had been made under an illegal sales tax,
which provided that no refunds should be made to a seller unless he could prove that
he had not shifted the tax to his purchasers. United States v. Jefferson Electric Mfg.
Co., 291 U. S. 386 (1934) ; see Bondurant, The WVindfall Tax (1939) 37 Micn. L. Ray.
357, 361.
39. Tax refund suits must usually be brought within a relatively short time. See
City of New York, Local Law No. 24, published as No. 25, of 1934 § 10, p. 171. Actions
against the retailer are not so restricted. See N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 48. For an
argument that the period of limitations in refund suits should be extended, see Field,
Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes (1932) 45 HAMv. L. RE. 501, 519.
*President of the United States of America, cx rel. Caputo v. Kelly, 96 F. (2d)
787 (C. C.A. 2d, 1938).
1. E.g., Wright v. Henkel, 190 U. S. 40 (1903) ; Collins Y. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309
(1922) ; Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U. S. 276 (1933), (1933) 42 YA . L. J. 978;
1 MooRE, EXTRADITIOx (1891) 112, 113; Borchard, The Factor Extradition Case (1934)
28 A.. J. Ixr. L. 742; Hudson, The Factor Case and Double Cri inality in Extradition
(1934) 28 Aar. J. INT. L. 274.
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requesting and asylum countries. Its ramifications are illustrated by a recent
case. 2 After one Caputo, a French citizen, had committed murder in Marseilles
and fled the country, a French court convicted him par contuntace (by default
proceedings) and sentenced him to death. The French government located
him in New York twelve years later and obtained a warrant for extradition
proceedings. Caputo sued out a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the
charges against him had been barred by France's statute of limitations. Under
French law, although the punishment imposed by a criminal judgment is not
barred until twenty years after rendition,3 public prosecution for crimes pun-
ishable by death is outlawed ten years after the last charge, indictment or
other proceedings. 4 On the theory that the ten-year statute of the requesting
country was controlling, Caputo maintained that extradition was no longer
possible. Dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals." The appellate tribunal pointed out that by the terms of
our extradition treaty with France extradition is to be denied only if pro-
ceedings or penalty are barred according to the statutes of the asyhun coun-
try.6 New York provides no limitations upon either prosecution or punish-
ment for murder, and the opinion then avoided a direct ruling on Caputo's
contention that the statute of France, the demanding country, would also be
controlling, by holding that in any event the French prescription period had
not run its course. The fact that French courts consider convictions par con-
tunace to be subject to the twenty-year period, rather than to the ten-year
prescription for charges,7 was, to the majority of the court, determinative.
A dissenting opinion endorsed Caputo's position with an ingenious argu-
ment made possible by the differing legal concepts of the two nations. Criminal
judgments by default similar to the French conviction par conttniace occur
in many continental jurisdictions," but they have no counterpart in common
2. President of the United States of America, ex rel. Caputo v. Kelly, 96 F. (2d)
787 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
3. CODE D'INs TUcTION CRIMINELLE (Carpentier, 1930) art. 635.
4. Id., art. 637. The prescriptive period will be started anew by such official acts
of prosecution as a reconstruction of the crime, interrogation of witnesses, or seizure
of evidence. However, it is doubtful if more than one extension could thus be obtained,
GARRAUD, PaECIS DE DROIT CRIMINEL (15th ed. 1934) § 353(c).
5. President of the United States of America, ex re. Caputo v. Kelly, 96 F. (2d)
787 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), aff'g, President of the United States of America, ex rel. Caputo
v. Kelly (S. D. N. Y. 1938) (unreported) dismissing second writ of habeas corpus.
The first writ of habeas corpus (on objections to evidence) was dismissed in President
of the United States of America, ex rel. Caputo v. Kelly, 19 F. Supp. 730 (S. D. N. Y.
1937), aff'd, 92 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 635 (1938) (the
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to pass on the present contention, lacking proof of
French law, but a dissent suggested new proceedings on this point).
After the second dismissal.was affirmed, Caputo was surrendered to France on a
State Department warrant dated June 14, 1938.
6. Convention of Jan. 6, 1909, art. VIII, 37 STAT. 1526, at 1531 (1911)
7. Semonin Case, Court of Cassation, Dec. 5, 1861 (D. P. 62.1.404); GARRAVD,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 356(B) (1) (b).
8. E.g., the German Abwesenheitsurteil; see STRAFPROZESSORtDNUN, (1877) §§ 276,
277, 282(b), as amended, Law of June 28, 1935, 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATW I, 847.
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law countries. In France this sentence has the peculiar status of being im-
possible of execution, for if the condemned is apprehended before the twenty
year prescriptive period has elapsed, he receives a new trial of right. While
the default judgment may affect his civil rights and property, it cannot affect
his person.9 Since the sentence is not definitive, in common law jurisdictions
a person convicted par contumace has usually been regarded for ex'tradition
purposes as one merely charged with crime. This view has been advanced by
commentators' ° and consistently adhered to by our Department of State"
and by our courtsY2 Assuming then that Caputo was to be treated as a man
charged with murder, the dissenting opinion applied the French limitation
on charges and, pursuant to the statute, found them to be outlawed after ten
years. The apparent force of the provision of the Extradition Convention
mentioning only the prescriptive statutes of the asylum country was discounted
by adducing authority that such a provision did not and should not exclude
recourse to the statute of limitations of the demanding country13
Despite the logical nicety of the argument, the results are indicative of its
sophistic nature. The conviction par con tunace, completely alien to the com-
mon law, was severed from the French trichotomy of convictions, convictions
par contumace and charges, and forced into the simpler common law dichotomy
of convictions and charges. Found to more closely resemble the latter, it
was classified as such. Treating it then as a common law charge, the dissent
referred back to the French statute of limitations on charges,14 failing to
9. GAERAuD, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 517-519.
10. See 1 HYDE, IER1NATIOxAL LAW (1922) §327; 1 MoorE, ExrnMoirio:. (1891)
§ 102; see also English Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 VicT. c. 5:2, § 26.
11. See 1 M1fooRE, ExTRADT roN (1891) § 102, pp. 132-134; also telegram from Acting
Secretary of State to the American Ambassador to Turkey, 2 FoREmN Rrxrio:s (1907)
1070, advising "since condemnation by default is not recognized in the United States,
a fugitive in this condition is in the same situation as a fugitive merely charged with
crime . . . "
12. Ex parte Fudera, 162 Fed. 591 (C. C. S. D. X.Y. 1908), appeal dismnissed, 219
U. S. 589 (1911); Ex parte La 'Mantia, 206 Fed. 330 (S.D. N. Y. 1913); see Hyde,
A Report of a Recent Extradition Case:-Re if acaltso (1912) 7 IL. L. r. 237.
13. Citing a Swiss case, Extradition 'Marcellin, 44 Arrfts du Tribunal f. s. 177
(1918), wherein a similar treaty provision was construed to allow recourse to the law
of the demanding country. The court explained that since an extradition demand pre-
supposes punishability, refusal of extradition where punishability does not exist "follows
naturally" and express provision was unnecessary; but no such presumption applies to
the law of the asylum and express stipulation for its application was requircd.
14. Great reliance was placed upon two Argentine cases, Extradition of 'astrangelo,
71 Fallos 182 (1897) and Extradition of Viscussi, 108 Fallos 181 (1907), the only
authorities cited supporting application of the foreign prescription law for charges to a
conviction par contumace despite the fact that the foreign court would have applied the
prescription for convictions. But examination discloses that in both cases the law applied
was the domestic prescription on charges (in the earlier case, according to the rule
where no treaty existed; in the later case, because the intervening Italo-Argentine treaty
provided double limitation). That Caputo's extradition, under the American 0evi, of
convictions par contunmace (note 11, supra), would be barred by the expiration of any
New York prescriptive period limiting public action for murder, seems evident. Beyond
authority for this proposition, the cited cases should not be extended.
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recognize that there is only resemblance, and not identity, between convic-
tions par contumace and common law charges. A proper procedure would
acknowledge this lack of identity by reference back to the original category
with the consequent application of the twenty year prescriptive period em-
ployed by French courts. It is claimed that to do this is to subordinate the
treaty to French law, yet patently the only justification for examining the
limitations of the demanding country is to anticipate their application, and it
is undisputed that France can try, and execute Caputo after extradition occurs.
The dissent thus would present the paradox of a man, who could be prose-
cuted by either country had both crime and apprehension occurred within its
territory, achieving immunity through disparity between the two systems of
jurisprudence. Such an interpretation of a treaty of extradition does violence
to its ultimate purpose-the assurance that no major criminal, through flight,
can escape trial by his natural judges.
The broader problem of whether the statute of limitations of the requesting
country should be a determinant factor in extradition proceedings remains
unanswered. Reference to this statute was a necessary step in the reasoning
of both majority and dissent, although the former opinion mentioned it
merely to avoid a ruling on the very question posed. While some authorities
on international law endorse double limitation,r writers are generally agreed,
despite the prevalence of treaty provisions to the contrary, that the statute
of the requesting country should be the only proper test.10 If ability to
prosecute is viewed as an integral part of criminality, it may be argued that
a man cannot be deprived of his asylum until it is shown by reference to the
limitation laws of the demanding country that he remains in fact a criminal;
that he can hardly be considered "fugitive" from a justice powerless to act
against him; and that any extradition proceeding should on this point be
subject to challenge.
Such an approach seemingly misconstrues the nature of the extradition
process. It is not properly a trial of the accused, but rather a committal for
trial-only a prima facie case need be shown.17 All matters of defense, in-
cluding the foreign statute of limitations, should be left for the courts of the
demanding country, as in intrastate rendition.1 8 Jurisdiction in extradition
proceedings may be challenged by habeas corpus, but the only jurisdictional
facts required by most United States treaties are (1) that the person shall
be charged with or convicted of one of the specified crimes, and (2) that he
15. E.g., DRAFT CONVENTION ON ExTmRAioN (1935) 29 (Supp.) Am. J. INT. L.
21, art. 4, at 22. For general discussion, see Comment on art. 4, id. at 99 ct seq.
16. 1 MOORE, EXTRADITION (1891) § 373; BILLOT, TRAIf DR L'EXTRADITION (1874)
pp. 220-221; DRArr CONVENTION ON EXTRADITION (1935) 29 (Stipp.) Am. 3. INT. L,
21, art. 4, Comment, at 99.
17. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457 (1888); 1 HYDE, INTMRNATIONAL LAW
(1922) 604, n. 1. For an account of the Insull case, in which the United States pro-
tested actual trial by the Greek court, see Hyde, The Extradiion Case of Samuel
Insult, Sr., in Relation to Greece (1934) 28 AM. J. INr. L. 307.
18. Biddinger v. Police Commissioner, 245 U. S. 128 (1917), 77 A. L. R. 902




be found within the territory of the asylum country. 10 Ability to prosecute
is not specifically required. Nor for American courts is it an element which
must be considered in determining whether a cause of action exists for extra-
dition purposes. For while most continental jurisdictions consider the statute
of limitations substantive in nature, inherent in the cause of action, it is here
regarded as procedural, and this view, as the law of the forum, should pre-
vail.20 As a practical matter, such a solution avoids attendant difficulties of
construction and possible misapplications, purposeless in view of the slight
actual effect of a consideration of foreign law. For it may be presumed a
nation will demand extradition only if it can prosecute-ulterior motives are
met with the rule that only the crime specified may be tried2l-and we are
bound by the existence of a treaty to assume that the trial will be fair and
any valid defense admitted. Perhaps the sole effect of a rule requiring appli-
cation of the statute of limitations of the demanding country would be to
permit arguments such as that of the instant dissent to defeat the purpose of
extradition and the moral judgments of both nations.
19. E.g., Great Britain [Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842) art. X, 8 STAT. 572,
at 576 (1867)]; Italy [Convention of March 23, 1S6S, art. I, 15 STAT. 629 (18&9)];
France [Convention of Jan. 6, 190, art. I, 37 STAT. 1526, at 1527 (1911)].
20. CHEATHAmI, DOWLING AND GoODCIcI, CoNFLIcT or LAWs (1936) 371, citing
Comment (1919) 28 YALE L. j. 492; REsTATEnENT, CoNFLIcTr oF LA, ws (1934) §§584,
585.
21. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407 (1886); 1 HYDE, IN EIATIO::AL L. w
(1922) §322; 4 MoonE, DIGEST oF INExRATioNAL LAw (1906) §§596-602.
19391
